Abstract

Jean Piaget (1896–1980) held that children construct their knowledge of the world through their own activity, reshaping mental structures whenever experience fails to fit them, and that this construction passes through four ordered stages between infancy and adolescence. Later work kept his constructivism and much of his ordering of competences but revised the timing and the explanatory role of the stages. Looking-time studies credited young infants with expectations about hidden objects, small quantities and other minds earlier than the stages allow; a cross-cultural review found the sequence verified in most cases but its pace variable; and critics argued that the stages describe change without explaining it. This article reviews Piaget's account, its central tasks, its critiques and the neo-Piagetian, core knowledge, theory theory, rational constructivist, dynamic systems and inhibitory-control accounts that followed, each with its current standing.

Keywords: Jean Piaget, cognitive development, constructivism, stage theory, conservation

Jean Piaget, who lived from 1896 to 1980, studied how children's thinking develops, and a 2009 edited volume of expert essays presents his work as a distinctive theory of human development (Müller et al., 2009). Flavell's appreciative review credited him with founding the modern study of cognitive development; that verdict was offered as a personal assessment, and the essay left criticisms aside by design (Flavell, 1996). The influence has not faded. A 2015 theoretical paper, illustrated with a single case study, maintained that ideas traceable to Piaget still underlie current accounts of how concepts develop (Carey et al., 2015).

This page treats Piaget as a researcher and theorist within developmental psychology: his life and principal works, his constructivist account of how knowledge is built, the four stages, the object-permanence and conservation tasks, the critiques of the stage account, and the theories that followed. A companion page covers Piaget's theory as a topic in its own right.

Key Takeaways

  • Piaget explained development through assimilation, accommodation and equilibration, and the constructivist core of that account was kept by later theories, including rational constructivism, which its proponent describes as constructivist in spirit but non-Piagetian.
  • The four stages run from the sensorimotor stage up to about 2 years to the formal operational stage from about 12; a review of heterogeneous non-Western studies found the stages verified in most cases but their rate dependent on culture.
  • Looking-time experiments credited infants of 3½ to 4½ months with object permanence (at 3½ months only among fast habituators, a result also attributed to a perceptual preference for motion) and 5-month-olds with small-number addition and subtraction, although a replication with the same procedure found no systematic evidence of adding or subtracting.
  • The A-not-B error has been linked to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in infants and monkeys and, in a competing dynamic account, to the coupled dynamics of reaching; the dynamic account was proposed as an alternative to concept-based explanations of the error.
  • Stage theory stands as revised rather than refuted: critics argue the stages describe change without explaining it, defenders argue most criticisms misread Piaget, without claiming that a better reading makes every problem vanish, and the infant evidence against the stages faces paradigm and replication questions.

Life and Work

Piaget's life spanned the years 1896 to 1980 (Müller et al., 2009). Two of his books on infancy laid the ground for much of what followed: one traced the origins of intelligence in children (Piaget, 1952), and the other described how the child comes to construct reality (Piaget, 1954). With Bärbel Inhelder he extended the programme upward in age, in a study of how logical thinking grows between childhood and adolescence (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). A 1964 journal paper took up the relation between development and learning in children's cognition (Piaget, 1964). His 1970 book Genetic Epistemology set out his genetic epistemology (Piaget, 1970).

English-language readers met the system as a whole largely through secondary syntheses. Flavell's 1963 book set out the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget at book length (Flavell, 1963). Nearly half a century later, a Cambridge companion assembled essays by specialists into a comprehensive introduction to his work (Müller et al., 2009).

How Children Build Knowledge

Piaget's starting point was that knowledge is built by the child rather than received from outside. Flavell, quoting Miller (1993), credited Piaget with changing the vocabulary of the field, so that developmentalists came to speak of schemes, cognitive structures and representations (Flavell, 1996). A scheme is an organised, repeatable pattern of action or thought that a child brings to new objects and events.

Three processes move the system. Assimilation takes an experience into an existing scheme; accommodation changes the scheme when an experience will not fit; and equilibration regulates the balance between the two, so that each disturbance is followed by a more stable organisation (Figure 1). A 2017 theoretical paper, which reported no empirical data and was written to draw implications for reading and listening comprehension, argued that equilibration is the process that drives cognitive development and cognitive adaptation in Piaget's system, and related it to schema theory (Bormanaki & Khoshhal, 2017); Piaget's own book on the equilibration of cognitive structures presents it as the central problem of intellectual development (Piaget, 1985).

Constructivism has outlived its original Piagetian form. Carey and colleagues named it, with stage theory, as one of the two main thrusts of Piaget's work, and argued that both still shape modern research on conceptual development, though in forms reworked by cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience (Carey et al., 2015). Xu went further in separating the commitment from its original form, describing her own rational constructivism as a non-Piagetian view yet constructivist in spirit (Xu, 2019).

Figure 1

Assimilation, Accommodation and Equilibration in Piaget's Account

A cycle linking an existing scheme, assimilation, accommodation and a new equilibrium On the left a box labelled Existing scheme. An arrow labelled Assimilation runs to a central box labelled New experience fits the scheme. A second path labelled Accommodation runs from a box labelled Experience does not fit to a box on the right labelled Revised scheme. A curved arrow labelled Equilibration returns from the revised scheme to the existing scheme, closing the cycle. Existing scheme Experience fits taken into the scheme Experience does not fit the scheme must change Revised scheme Assimilation Accommodation Equilibration
Note. An experience that fits an existing scheme is assimilated to it; one that does not forces the scheme to accommodate, and equilibration is the regulating process that restores balance between the two. Original schematic.

The Four Stages

Piaget's stage theory orders development into four broad periods, and its standing today is that of a revised account rather than a discarded one: a 2016 critical review took stock of developmental stages in general and Piagetian stages in particular (Lourenço, 2016), after decades in which earlier infant competences (Baillargeon, 1987), cross-cultural differences in pace (Dasen, 1972) and the charge that stages describe rather than explain (Brainerd, 1978) had forced revisions (see Critiques of the Stage Account).

The age bands attached to the stages are conventions, not deadlines. In Houdé and Borst's outline, the years up to age 2 are sensorimotor, ages two to 7 are preoperational, ages 7 to 12 are concrete operational, and formal operations start at 12 (Houdé & Borst, 2015). The sensorimotor period is where Piaget's tests of the object concept belong; the A-not-B search task, for instance, was his Stage IV test of object permanence (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). The passage from preoperational to concrete operational thought is marked most famously by number conservation, which children typically pass at around 6 or 7 years of age (Houdé & Borst, 2015).

For the final stage, Piaget's own later statement put the emergence of formal operations between 12 and 15 years, characterising them by hypothetical reasoning and by combinatorial systems organised as 4-groups (Piaget, 1972). The same paper qualified the claim in three ways: the pace of this development varies across cultures, its application varies with aptitude and specialisation, and a young person's formal reasoning is best tested within a field relevant to his or her career and interests (Piaget, 1972).

Cross-cultural data tested the sequence directly. Dasen reviewed Piagetian research outside the West, classifying the descriptive studies by three readings of the stages, the first being 3 global stages; he judged the stages verified in most cases, but found that how quickly children moved through them varied with culture (Dasen, 1972). That review also addressed horizontal décalages and weighed 3 interpretations of the stages. Its limits were stated plainly: the studies were highly heterogeneous, large proportions of some non-Western samples did not reach concrete operations, the cultural causes of the differences went unspecified, and more quasi-experimental research was needed (Dasen, 1972).

Object Permanence and the A-not-B Error

Object permanence is the understanding that an object continues to exist when it can no longer be seen, and Piaget's account of how infants construct it, with the ages he attached to each step, appeared in his book on the child's construction of reality (Piaget, 1954).

Baillargeon's experiments were designed as a challenge to those age claims (Baillargeon, 1987). Using habituation and looking time, she showed 3½- and 4½-month-old infants a screen that rotated like a drawbridge through a 180° arc, in events staged to be either possible or impossible. The results indicated object permanence by 4½ months, and at 3½ months among infants who habituated quickly; slower habituators of that age did not show the effect (Baillargeon, 1987). That interpretation has been disputed: in two experiments of their own, Rivera and colleagues argued that infants' longer looking in the drawbridge procedure reflects a perceptual preference for motion rather than representational reasoning about object permanence (Rivera et al., 1999).

The A-not-B error offered a second line of evidence. An infant who has repeatedly found a toy at location A keeps searching at A after watching it hidden at B. Diamond and Goldman-Rakic followed human infants longitudinally between 7.5 and 12 months and compared them on the AB task with intact and lesioned rhesus monkeys, whose AB scores matched their scores on the Delayed Response task (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Older infants needed a longer delay before the error appeared, over 10 s at 12 months; lesion results in monkeys led the authors to tie AB performance to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and to suggest that its maturation may underlie the infants' improvement. A dynamic systems account competes with that explanation. Thelen and colleagues modelled perseverative reaching in 7–12 month-old infants with a dynamic field theory, treating the A-not-B error as an outcome of coupled action dynamics in goal-directed reaching rather than as a gap in the infant's concept of the object, and they framed the model within embodied cognition (Thelen et al., 2001). The approach was later set out at book length in Dynamic Thinking, a primer on dynamic field theory (Schöner et al., 2016). The prefrontal account locates the error in a maturing brain region; the field account locates it in the history and dynamics of reaching. Neither has displaced the other, and the two remain rival explanations of the same behaviour.

Conservation

Conservation is the understanding that a quantity is unchanged when only its appearance is altered. In the number-conservation task, a child sees two rows holding the same number of counters, after which one row is spread out so that it looks longer. Children typically judge the rows equal at around 6 or 7 years of age (Houdé & Borst, 2015).

The inhibitory-control theory reinterprets that milestone in neo-Piagetian terms, and its evidence comes mainly from its proponents' own laboratory. Houdé and Borst argued that younger children are misled by a length-equals-number heuristic, and that logical reasoning succeeds when such misleading heuristics are inhibited; they framed the contrast as heuristics versus algorithms, or System 1 versus System 2 (Houdé & Borst, 2015). Their review drew on PET, fMRI and rTMS work, including an fMRI study of 60 children aged 5–10 and tasks such as an Animal Stroop task, and it proposed a prefrontal pedagogy built on psychological inhibition. The review has limits: much of its evidence comes from the authors' own laboratory, and its PET study tested only eight adults, each serving as their own control; its adult and child studies placed inhibition in the left and right inferior frontal gyrus respectively, a difference the authors attributed to verbal versus visuospatial task demands (Houdé & Borst, 2015).

A 2019 experiment from the same group pointed to a more gradual picture. Testing 6-year-old children with a card-sorting task and a Piaget-like numerical estimation task, Viarouge and colleagues suggested that success on the number-conservation task may reflect number becoming gradually easier to abstract, rather than a single conceptual shift, with numerical saliency, numerical sensitivity and spontaneous focusing on numerosity as the constructs of interest (Viarouge et al., 2019).

The conservation task also became an object of study in its own right. Gelman's training work treated conservation acquisition as a matter of learning to attend to the relevant attributes of a display (Gelman, 1969), and McGarrigle and Donaldson examined what they termed conservation accidents (McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974). The format of the question also mattered: first-grade children made fewer conservation errors on a version that asked for one judgment than on the standard task with its 2 judgments (Rose & Blank, 1974).

Critiques of the Stage Account

The strongest challenge to the stages came from infants who seemed to know more, earlier, than the sensorimotor stage allows. Spelke and colleagues reviewed infant experiments indicating that young infants reason about objects in line with 2 constraints, continuity and solidity, from early in life (Spelke et al., 1992). The same review found that gravity and inertia are not respected early, and suggested that those two principles may sit at the edge even of adults' physical conceptions. Number told a similar story: in looking-time experiments, 5-month-old infants responded as though they had computed the results of small additions and subtractions (Wynn, 1992). Replications have been mixed: Wakeley and colleagues used Wynn's procedure in three looking-time experiments with 68 infants aged 5 months, found the infants' reactions variable, and saw no systematic evidence that they were adding or subtracting (Wakeley et al., 2000). Wynn presented the result as evidence that infants possess true numerical concepts, against the alternative that purely perceptual discriminations underlie their responses to small numbers.

Social cognition followed the same path. Scott and Baillargeon reviewed evidence that false-belief understanding is present in infancy, with children under age 2 years succeeding on nontraditional tasks, and attributed failures on traditional false-belief tasks to processing demands rather than to absent understanding (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). They acknowledged an intense controversy over when the understanding begins. A preregistered attempt to replicate four implicit theory-of-mind paradigms mostly failed: only one paradigm replicated, that lone success did not survive once its confounds were removed, and the paradigms did not correlate with one another, which led the authors to question the validity of anticipatory-looking measures of false-belief reasoning (Kulke et al., 2018). A 2022 review of the foundations of theory of mind and its development in early childhood covers the same terrain (Rakoczy, 2022).

A different critique targeted the logic of the stages rather than their timing. Brainerd argued that Piaget's stages describe developmental change without explaining it, distinguishing three general senses of the word stage and raising objections to the five empirical criteria Piaget had offered for verifying his stages (Brainerd, 1978). On his analysis, the antecedents of each stage were never measured independently, apparent invariant sequences were often artefacts of measurement, the predictions of equilibration conflicted with the data, and the structure attributed to the child might reflect the structure of the task (Brainerd, 1978).

Defenders answered at comparable length. Lourenço and Machado replied to ten common criticisms and concluded that most rest on misinterpretations of the theory (Lourenço & Machado, 1996). Their defence was modest about its own reach: the authors did not claim to have recovered a true Piaget, or that the theory's problems disappear once it is better understood.

The infant evidence that drove the revisions has its own vulnerabilities. A 2024 conceptual overview weighed the strengths and limitations of the violation-of-expectation paradigm across 35 years of research on the first 3 years of life and discussed the challenges raised against it (Margoni et al., 2024). A collaborative proposal from infancy researchers cited small samples and limited measurement methods as reasons to replicate findings across many laboratories through the ManyBabies project (Frank et al., 2017). The current standing of stage theory reflects all of these strands: a 2016 critical review reassessed Piagetian stages (Lourenço, 2016), and the account is best described as revised, with its sequence largely retained and its timing and explanatory claims qualified. A rival picture drops the staircase altogether: Siegler's 1996 book treated cognitive development as an evolutionary process in which variability among ways of thinking, and adaptive choice among them, take the place of a sequence of discrete stages (Siegler, 1996).

Theories That Followed Piaget

Neo-Piagetian theories kept the idea of stages and tried to explain the transitions between them; their standing is that of a revised Piagetian programme rather than a replacement. Work on working memory bears on that programme: a 2016 review concluded that working-memory gains across the school-age years persist under controlled conditions, while cautioning that task supports have probably led to overestimates of infants' capacity and that research on infants and on children remains poorly connected (Cowan, 2016). Pascual-Leone offered a formal mathematical model of the rule by which children move from one Piagetian stage to the next (Pascual-Leone, 1970). Case linked the maturation of the frontal lobes to recurring cycles of cognitive development, spanning roughly 1.5 to 5 years and 5 to 10 years, and drew on attentional, executive and self-reflexive processes and on EEG coherence (Case, 1992). Case presented the psychological and neurological models as complementary rather than proven identical, and offered implications and predictions rather than new tests. A 2015 review traced theories of cognitive development from Piaget to the present (Barrouillet, 2015).

Core knowledge theory took the opposite course, proposing that young infants hold core knowledge of objects early, organised around continuity and solidity (Spelke et al., 1992). Its standing is contested. Haith's 1998 critique took up whether rich interpretation of infant cognition is too costly (Haith, 1998). It depends heavily on looking-time evidence, and a recent overview of the violation-of-expectation paradigm weighed that method's limitations alongside its strengths (Margoni et al., 2024), while infancy researchers have called for multi-laboratory replication because of small samples (Frank et al., 2017).

The theory theory holds that children build and revise intuitive theories much as scientists do, and its standing is revised. Gopnik and Wellman recast it in terms of probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning, drawing on studies of children aged 16 months to 4 years in domains including theory of mind, and called for closer collaboration between developmental and computational researchers (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012). Rational constructivism later absorbed domain-specific intuitive theories and Bayesian inductive learning into a broader framework (Xu, 2019).

Rational constructivism is a recent proposal, set out as a synthesis in 2019. Xu presented it as a step towards a rational constructivist theory, built on proto-conceptual primitives, domain-specific intuitive theories and three types of learning mechanisms, including Bayesian inductive learning, constructive thinking, and language and symbol learning, with cognitive agency in the child (Xu, 2019).

The field's priorities shifted as these alternatives arrived. Siegler, writing from his own perspective on 40 years of work, divided the period into three phases: a Piaget-dominated era, a period of alternative theories, and a turn towards cognitive development and education (Siegler, 2016). His own contributions in that account include overlapping waves theory, microgenetic methods and computer simulations of strategy choice and discovery.

The most frequent comparison remains with Lev Vygotsky. Lourenço's 2012 analysis set the two theorists side by side, stressing many resemblances and identifying one crucial difference between them (Lourenço, 2012).

Table 1

Piaget's Account and the Theories That Followed

TheoryCore claimStatusKey source
Stage theoryDevelopment passes through ordered stages from sensorimotor to formal operational thought; the stages held cross-culturally in most cases while their rate variedRevised (Lourenço, 2016)Lourenço, 2016; Dasen, 1972
Neo-Piagetian theoriesStage transitions modelled formally and linked to frontal maturation and cycles of cognitive developmentRevised (Barrouillet, 2015)Pascual-Leone, 1970; Case, 1992
Core knowledge theoryYoung infants hold core object knowledge, such as continuity and solidity; gravity and inertia not respected earlyContested (Margoni et al., 2024)Spelke et al., 1992; Margoni et al., 2024
Theory theoryChildren build intuitive theories, recast as probabilistic causal models acquired through Bayesian learningRevised (Xu, 2019)Gopnik & Wellman, 2012
Rational constructivismProto-conceptual primitives, intuitive theories and Bayesian inductive learning; constructivist in spirit but non-PiagetianProposed 2019 (Xu, 2019)Xu, 2019
Dynamic systems accountThe A-not-B error arises from coupled action dynamics in reachingContested (Thelen et al., 2001)Thelen et al., 2001
Inhibitory-control theoryLogical reasoning requires inhibiting misleading heuristics such as length-equals-number; evidence chiefly from the authors' own laboratoryProposed; tested mainly by its proponents (Houdé & Borst, 2015)Houdé & Borst, 2015

Note. Status gives each account's standing as described in the text. Revised means the account survives in modified form; contested means its central claim remains under active dispute. Proposed marks a recent account that no independent appraisal cited here has yet tested, and it is counted as contested.

Worked Example

The arithmetic below is illustrative and comes from no study. It shows why the number-conservation task pits length against number. Two rows each hold 6 counters. In row A the counters are spaced 2 cm apart, so the row spans (6 − 1) × 2 = 10 cm; in row B they are spaced 3 cm apart, so it spans (6 − 1) × 3 = 15 cm. The length ratio of the two rows is 15 / 10 = 1.5, while the number ratio is 1.

A judgment based on length therefore picks row B as having more, whereas a conserving judgment says the rows are equal. Adding counters does not change the conflict: with 8 counters per row, the spans become (8 − 1) × 2 = 14 cm and (8 − 1) × 3 = 21 cm, the same ratio of 1.5. The ConservationDemo reproduces these spans.

The ObjectPermanenceDemo uses an illustrative model of the same kind: at its default settings (8 months, a 3 s delay and 3 earlier reaches to A), it gives a 25% chance of searching at B, rising to 68% with no delay.

Discussion

Much of Piaget's account survives. Constructivism, the claim that children build knowledge through their own activity, remains a shared commitment of theories that otherwise disagree with him, from theory theory to rational constructivism. His tasks are still in use, and the ordering of competences he described has generally held up, as the cross-cultural evidence on the sequence of stages suggests.

What changed is timing, generality and explanation. Infants appear to hold expectations about objects, small numbers and beliefs earlier than the stages allow, and critics argued that a stage label summarises a pattern of performance without saying what causes the transition. The successor theories differ mainly in where they place that cause: in frontal maturation, in core knowledge present early in infancy, in Bayesian learning over intuitive theories, in the dynamics of action, or in the inhibition of misleading heuristics.

The evidence for early competence is not settled either. It rests largely on looking-time methods whose strengths and limitations are still being weighed, and on infant samples that are often small. A fair summary is that Piaget's questions and tasks still organise the field, while his answers about when and why children change have been revised and remain partly in dispute. Settling those disputes calls for multi-laboratory replication of infant findings and for designs that test competing mechanisms against one another rather than one at a time.

Current Directions

Recent work has concentrated on refining, not overturning, the constructivist core. Rational constructivism, with its proto-conceptual primitives and Bayesian inductive learning, is presented by its proponent as a non-Piagetian theory in the spirit of constructivism (Xu, 2019).

The methodological base of the infant critiques is under scrutiny. A conceptual overview has assessed the violation-of-expectation paradigm, including the links it draws between looking behaviour, surprise-driven learning and an infant's working model of the world (Margoni et al., 2024), and the ManyBabies proposal set out a collaborative, multi-laboratory route to more reproducible infancy research (Frank et al., 2017).

Early false-belief understanding remains one of the most active fronts, with the onset question still intensely disputed (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017) and reviewed again within broader accounts of theory of mind in early childhood (Rakoczy, 2022). In number, a study of 6-year-olds suggested that conservation may rest on gradual numerical abstraction rather than a conceptual shift (Viarouge et al., 2019). Siegler's personal account describes the field's most recent phase as a turn toward cognitive development and education (Siegler, 2016), and the stage concept itself has received a fresh critical review (Lourenço, 2016).

Common Misconceptions

Piaget's stages begin and end at fixed ages.
The ages are approximate. A review of non-Western studies found the stages verified in most cases but the rate of operational development dependent on culture, to the point that large proportions of some non-Western samples did not reach the concrete operational stage (Dasen, 1972). The belief persists because the age bands are usually quoted without the qualifications Piaget and his reviewers attached to them.
Infants have no idea that hidden objects still exist until late in the sensorimotor stage.
Looking-time experiments indicated object permanence by 4½ months, and at 3½ months among infants who habituated quickly (Baillargeon, 1987), although two later experiments put that longer looking down to a perceptual preference for motion rather than to reasoning (Rivera et al., 1999). The misconception comes from reading failure on manual search tasks as an absence of knowledge, when search also places demands on action.
Later research simply refuted Piaget.
Constructivism and stage theory, the two main thrusts of Piaget's work, still shape modern work on conceptual development, though transformed by later cognitive science and neuroscience (Carey et al., 2015). Later findings revised the timing and the explanatory role of the stages, but the field's questions and many of its tasks remain Piaget's.

Glossary

A-not-B error.
The tendency of infants in roughly the 7.5 to 12 month range to keep searching at a location where an object was previously found after seeing it hidden somewhere else; explained by prefrontal and dynamic systems accounts that remain in competition.
Accommodation.
In Piaget's account, the change in a scheme that occurs when an experience will not fit it.
Assimilation.
In Piaget's account, the taking of an experience into an existing scheme without changing the scheme.
Concrete operational stage.
The third of Piaget's stages, placed approximately between 7 and 12 years of age, in which children pass tasks such as number conservation.
Conservation.
The understanding that a quantity, such as the number of counters in a row, stays the same when only its appearance changes; for number, typically shown at around 6 or 7 years.
Core knowledge.
Knowledge proposed to be present early in infancy, such as expectations that objects move continuously and are solid; a contested alternative to Piaget's sensorimotor account.
Equilibration.
The regulating process that restores balance between assimilation and accommodation, treated in Piaget's system as the driver of cognitive development.
Formal operational stage.
The last of Piaget's stages, starting at about 12 years, marked by hypothetical and combinatorial reasoning; Piaget allowed that its pace varies across cultures and its application with aptitude and specialisation.
Horizontal décalage.
An unevenness within a stage, in which a child solves problems of the same logical kind at different ages depending on their content; one of the issues addressed in cross-cultural reviews of Piagetian research.
Inhibitory control.
The capacity to suppress a misleading response, such as the length-equals-number heuristic; central to a neo-Piagetian theory of reasoning tested mainly in its proponents' laboratory.
Neo-Piagetian theories.
Theories that keep a stage framework but explain transitions through formal models or brain maturation; a revised Piagetian programme.
Object permanence.
The understanding that an object continues to exist when out of sight; looking-time studies have indicated it by 4½ months, and by 3½ months in infants who habituated quickly, earlier than Piaget proposed, although that longer looking has also been attributed to a perceptual preference for motion.
Preoperational stage.
The second of Piaget's stages, placed approximately between two and 7 years of age, during which children typically fail number conservation.
Rational constructivism.
A 2019 proposal that combines proto-conceptual primitives, intuitive theories and Bayesian inductive learning; constructivist in spirit but non-Piagetian.
Scheme.
An organised, repeatable pattern of action or thought that a child applies to objects and events.
Sensorimotor stage.
The first of Piaget's stages, up to about 2 years of age, to which his tests of object permanence belong.
Theory theory.
The view that children build and revise intuitive theories, revised in terms of probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning.
Violation-of-expectation paradigm.
A method that infers infant expectations from looking behaviour toward possible and impossible events; its strengths and limitations remain under review.

Key Researchers

Renée Baillargeon

(b. 1954). Alumni Distinguished Professor Emerita of Psychology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; her looking-time experiments tested what young infants expect of hidden objects. Wikipedia - Faculty Page

Alison Gopnik

(b. 1955). Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley; with Henry Wellman she recast the theory theory in terms of causal models and Bayesian learning. ORCID - Wikidata - Wikipedia - Faculty Page

Olivier Houdé

(b. 1963). Professor of Psychology at Université Paris Cité and honorary director of LaPsyDÉ; with Grégoire Borst he proposed an inhibitory-control theory of the developing reasoning brain. Wikidata - Wikipedia

Bärbel Inhelder

(1913–1997). Psychologist at the University of Geneva and Piaget's collaborator; co-author with him of the study of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. Wikidata - Wikipedia

Jean Piaget

(1896–1980). Swiss psychologist at the University of Geneva whose studies of children's thinking are credited with founding the modern study of cognitive development. Wikidata - Wikipedia

Robert S. Siegler

(b. 1949). Jacob H. Schiff Foundations Professor of Psychology and Education at Teachers College, Columbia University; developer of overlapping waves theory and of microgenetic methods for studying strategy change; his 1996 book argued for an evolutionary framework of variability and adaptive choice in place of a staircase of stages (Siegler, 1996). Wikidata - Wikipedia - Faculty Page

Elizabeth S. Spelke

(b. 1949). Marshall L. Berkman Professor of Psychology at Harvard University; her infant studies argued that core knowledge of objects is present early in life. ORCID - Wikidata - Wikipedia - Faculty Page

Fei Xu

Professor of Psychology and Director of the Berkeley Early Learning Lab at the University of California, Berkeley; leading proponent of rational constructivism. ORCID - Wikidata - Wikipedia - Faculty Page

Frequently Asked Questions

Who was Jean Piaget?

Jean Piaget lived from 1896 to 1980 and studied how children come to understand the world; a 2009 edited volume offers a comprehensive introduction to his work on human development (Müller et al., 2009).

What does Piaget's theory of cognitive development say?

It holds that children construct knowledge by assimilating experience to existing schemes and accommodating those schemes when experience does not fit, with equilibration driving the process, a reading set out in a 2017 theoretical paper that reported no empirical data (Bormanaki & Khoshhal, 2017).

What are Piaget's four stages?

In order, the sequence runs sensorimotor until roughly age 2, preoperational from about two to 7, concrete operational from about 7 to 12, and formal operational from around 12 on, in Houdé and Borst's outline of Piaget's account (Houdé & Borst, 2015).

What is object permanence?

Object permanence is the understanding that an object still exists when hidden, and looking-time experiments indicated it by 4½ months and, among fast habituators only, by 3½ months, earlier than Piaget proposed (Baillargeon, 1987), although later experiments attributed the longer looking to a perceptual preference for motion (Rivera et al., 1999).

What is conservation in Piaget's theory?

Conservation is the understanding that a quantity stays the same when its appearance changes, and children typically pass the number version at around 6 or 7 years, once they resist judging number by the length of a row (Houdé & Borst, 2015).

What is wrong with Piaget's stage theory?

A leading critique argued that the stages describe developmental change without explaining it, because their antecedents were never measured independently and apparent sequences may reflect the tasks used (Brainerd, 1978).

How do Piaget and Vygotsky differ?

A 2012 comparison by Lourenço stressed that the two theories resemble each other in many respects and identified one crucial difference between them (Lourenço, 2012).

Is Piaget's theory still used today?

His constructivism and his stage theory still shape research on how children's concepts develop, though transformed by later cognitive science and neuroscience, according to a 2015 theoretical paper illustrated with a case study of conceptual change (Carey et al., 2015).

References

Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3½- and 4½-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23(5), 655-664. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.23.5.655

Barrouillet, P. (2015). Theories of cognitive development: From Piaget to today. Developmental Review, 38, 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2015.07.004

Bormanaki, H. B., & Khoshhal, Y. (2017). The role of equilibration in Piaget's theory of cognitive development and its implication for receptive skills: A theoretical study. Journal of Language Teaching and Research, 8(5), 996. https://doi.org/10.17507/jltr.0805.22

Brainerd, C. J. (1978). The stage question in cognitive-developmental theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(2), 173-182. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00073842

Carey, S., Zaitchik, D., & Bascandziev, I. (2015). Theories of development: In dialog with Jean Piaget. Developmental Review, 38, 36-54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2015.07.003

Case, R. (1992). The role of the frontal lobes in the regulation of cognitive development. Brain and Cognition, 20(1), 51-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/0278-2626(92)90061-P

Cowan, N. (2016). Working memory maturation: Can we get at the essence of cognitive growth? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(2), 239-264. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691615621279

Dasen, P. R. (1972). Cross-cultural Piagetian research: A summary. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 3(1), 23-40. https://doi.org/10.1177/002202217200300102

Diamond, A., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Comparison of human infants and rhesus monkeys on Piaget's AB task: Evidence for dependence on dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 74(1), 24-40. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00248277

Flavell, J. H. (1963). The developmental psychology of Jean Piaget. D. Van Nostrand. https://doi.org/10.1037/11449-000

Flavell, J. H. (1996). Piaget's legacy. Psychological Science, 7(4), 200-203. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00359.x

Frank, M. C., Bergelson, E., Bergmann, C., Cristia, A., Floccia, C., Gervain, J., Hamlin, J. K., Hannon, E. E., Kline, M., Levelt, C., Lew-Williams, C., Nazzi, T., Panneton, R., Rabagliati, H., Soderstrom, M., Sullivan, J., Waxman, S., & Yurovsky, D. (2017). A collaborative approach to infant research: Promoting reproducibility, best practices, and theory-building. Infancy, 22(4), 421-435. https://doi.org/10.1111/infa.12182

Gelman, R. (1969). Conservation acquisition: A problem of learning to attend to relevant attributes. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 7(2), 167-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0965(69)90041-1

Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. M. (2012). Reconstructing constructivism: Causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory theory. Psychological Bulletin, 138(6), 1085-1108. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028044

Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21(2), 167-179. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(98)90001-7

Houdé, O., & Borst, G. (2015). Evidence for an inhibitory-control theory of the reasoning brain. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9, 148. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00148

Inhelder, B., & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence: An essay on the construction of formal operational structures (A. Parsons & S. Milgram, Trans.). Basic Books. https://doi.org/10.1037/10034-000

Kulke, L., von Duhn, B., Schneider, D., & Rakoczy, H. (2018). Is implicit theory of mind a real and robust phenomenon? Results from a systematic replication study. Psychological Science, 29(6), 888-900. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617747090

Lourenço, O. (2012). Piaget and Vygotsky: Many resemblances, and a crucial difference. New Ideas in Psychology, 30(3), 281-295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2011.12.006

Lourenço, O., & Machado, A. (1996). In defense of Piaget's theory: A reply to 10 common criticisms. Psychological Review, 103(1), 143-164. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.1.143

Lourenço, O. M. (2016). Developmental stages, Piagetian stages in particular: A critical review. New Ideas in Psychology, 40, 123-137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.08.002

Margoni, F., Surian, L., & Baillargeon, R. (2024). The violation-of-expectation paradigm: A conceptual overview. Psychological Review, 131(3), 716-748. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000450

McGarrigle, J., & Donaldson, M. (1974). Conservation accidents. Cognition, 3(4), 341-350. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(74)90003-1

Müller, U., Carpendale, J. I. M., & Smith, L. (Eds.). (2009). The Cambridge companion to Piaget. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521898584

Pascual-Leone, J. (1970). A mathematical model for the transition rule in Piaget's developmental stages. Acta Psychologica, 32, 301-345. https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(70)90108-3

Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children (M. Cook, Trans.). International Universities Press. https://doi.org/10.1037/11494-000

Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child (M. Cook, Trans.). Basic Books. https://doi.org/10.1037/11168-000

Piaget, J. (1964). Part I: Cognitive development in children: Piaget development and learning. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 2(3), 176-186. https://doi.org/10.1002/tea.3660020306

Piaget, J. (1970). Genetic epistemology (E. Duckworth, Trans.). Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/piag91272

Piaget, J. (1972). Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood. Human Development, 15(1), 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1159/000271225

Piaget, J. (1985). The equilibration of cognitive structures: The central problem of intellectual development (T. Brown & K. J. Thampy, Trans.). University of Chicago Press.

Rakoczy, H. (2022). Foundations of theory of mind and its development in early childhood. Nature Reviews Psychology, 1(4), 223-235. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-022-00037-z

Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference? Developmental Psychology, 35(2), 427-435. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.35.2.427

Rose, S. A., & Blank, M. (1974). The potency of context in children's cognition: An illustration through conservation. Child Development, 45(2), 499-502. https://doi.org/10.2307/1127977

Schöner, G., Spencer, J. P., & the DFT Research Group. (2016). Dynamic thinking: A primer on dynamic field theory. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300563.001.0001

Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2017). Early false-belief understanding. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(4), 237-249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.012

Siegler, R. S. (1996). Emerging minds: The process of change in children's thinking. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195077872.001.0001

Siegler, R. S. (2016). Continuity and change in the field of cognitive development and in the perspectives of one cognitive developmentalist. Child Development Perspectives, 10(2), 128-133. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12173

Spelke, E. S., Breinlinger, K., Macomber, J., & Jacobson, K. (1992). Origins of knowledge. Psychological Review, 99(4), 605-632. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.99.4.605

Thelen, E., Schöner, G., Scheier, C., & Smith, L. B. (2001). The dynamics of embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01003910

Viarouge, A., Houdé, O., & Borst, G. (2019). The progressive 6-year-old conserver: Numerical saliency and sensitivity as core mechanisms of numerical abstraction in a Piaget-like estimation task. Cognition, 190, 137-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.005

Wakeley, A., Rivera, S., & Langer, J. (2000). Can young infants add and subtract? Child Development, 71(6), 1525-1534. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00244

Wynn, K. (1992). Addition and subtraction by human infants. Nature, 358(6389), 749-750. https://doi.org/10.1038/358749a0

Xu, F. (2019). Towards a rational constructivist theory of cognitive development. Psychological Review, 126(6), 841-864. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000153