Abstract

Traumatic brain injury is a disruption of brain function caused by an external mechanical force. It belongs to cognitive psychology because what it damages is chiefly cognition: attention, memory, executive function, and processing speed are the faculties most reliably impaired, because the physics of injury falls hardest on the frontal lobes and on the long white-matter tracts that bind distant regions into working networks. Injury severity is graded not by a lesion's size but by the depth and duration of altered consciousness, using the Glasgow Coma Scale and the length of post-traumatic amnesia. Because the signature lesion is diffuse axonal injury that disconnects rather than destroys, traumatic brain injury is increasingly understood as a disorder of disrupted network communication whose cognitive consequences can outlast the structural damage.

Keywords: traumatic brain injury, diffuse axonal injury, cognitive sequelae

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is defined as an alteration in brain function, or other evidence of brain pathology, caused by an external force (Menon et al., 2010). That definition is deliberately broad — it covers the concussed athlete who never loses consciousness and the patient in a coma after a road crash — because the unifying feature is not the symptom but the cause: energy delivered to the brain from outside. What makes TBI a subject for cognitive psychology, rather than trauma surgery alone, is that the brain is not a passive organ that either works or does not. It is the substrate of thought, and an injury to it is felt as a change in *thinking* — in what a person can attend to, remember, plan, and do — long after any wound has healed (Rabinowitz & Levin, 2014). The clinical challenge of TBI is a cognitive challenge, and the tools that measure its damage are the tools of cognitive assessment.

Key Takeaways

  • Traumatic brain injury is a disruption of brain function caused by an external mechanical force, not a stroke, tumour, or degenerative disease from within.
  • Its severity is graded by the depth and duration of altered consciousness — the Glasgow Coma Scale and post-traumatic amnesia — not by the size of any single lesion.
  • The faculties it most reliably impairs are attention, memory, executive function, and processing speed, because injury falls hardest on the frontal lobes and long white-matter tracts.
  • The characteristic lesion, diffuse axonal injury, disconnects rather than destroys, so TBI is understood as a disorder of disrupted network communication.
  • TBI is a leading global cause of death and disability, and its cognitive effects can evolve for years, sometimes into neurodegeneration.

Figure 1

Focal Versus Diffuse Injury and the Disconnection of Brain Networks

A diagram contrasting a focal contusion at one site with diffuse axonal injury that severs the long tracts connecting distant regions. On the left, a single dark focal lesion sits at one point of a brain outline. On the right, the same network of regions is intact at the nodes but the long connecting fibres between them are broken, showing that diffuse axonal injury damages communication between regions rather than any one region. Two ways an impact damages the brain Focal contusion bruise damage at one site Diffuse axonal injury connections severed, nodes spared
Note. A focal injury (left) destroys tissue at one site, and its effects follow the function of that place. Diffuse axonal injury (right) leaves the grey-matter regions largely intact but shears the long axons that connect them, so distant areas can no longer communicate. Because so much of cognition depends on coordination among regions, the diffuse pattern produces widespread deficits in attention, speed, and executive control out of proportion to any visible lesion. Original schematic after the network account of Sharp, Scott, and Leech (2014).

What Traumatic Brain Injury Is

A traumatic brain injury is, by consensus definition, *an alteration in brain function, or other evidence of brain pathology, caused by an external force* (Menon et al., 2010). Each clause does work. *External force* separates TBI from insults that arise within — a stroke, a tumour, an infection — and covers the whole range of mechanisms: a direct blow, a rapid acceleration and deceleration that whips the brain within the skull, a blast wave, or a penetrating object. *Alteration in brain function* is deliberately behavioural — any loss of consciousness, any gap in memory for the event, any confusion or neurological sign counts — so that the definition captures the concussion that leaves no mark on a scan as well as the haemorrhage that does (Menon et al., 2010). Reaching a shared definition mattered because for decades the same injury was counted differently by different studies, frustrating any attempt to measure the problem or compare treatments (Maas et al., 2017).

The mechanical event sets off two waves of damage. The *primary injury* is the tissue disruption at the moment of impact: contusion where the brain strikes bone, and the shearing of axons as layers of brain of differing density move against one another. The *secondary injury* unfolds over hours and days — swelling, disturbed blood flow, excitotoxicity, and inflammation — and it is the target of most acute treatment because, unlike the primary injury, it can still be prevented or limited (McAllister, 2011). The distinction is central to how TBI is managed: the blow cannot be undone, but the cascade it triggers can be fought.

TBI is a vast public-health problem. It is among the leading causes of death and disability worldwide, and the Global Burden of Disease study estimated that tens of millions of people sustain a traumatic brain injury each year, with the number of people living with its consequences far larger still (GBD 2016 Traumatic Brain Injury and Spinal Cord Injury Collaborators, 2019). Falls and road traffic are the dominant causes, and incidence peaks at the extremes of age, so the population burden is concentrated among the very young and the old (Corrigan et al., 2010). Most cases — the great majority — are mild, but mild does not mean trivial: even injuries that leave no visible lesion can produce measurable cognitive change (Carroll et al., 2004), (McInnes et al., 2017).

Types of Traumatic Brain Injuries

Traumatic brain injury is itself a kind of *brain injury* — in the MeSH hierarchy it sits beneath the broader descriptor *Brain Injuries* — and MeSH indexes three specific traumatic entities beneath it. It is worth stressing that MeSH is an *indexing* classification built to retrieve literature, not a clinical taxonomy of severity or mechanism: the three descriptors below are the traumatic brain injury entities given their own indexing terms, not an exhaustive account of how the brain can be hurt. The clinically decisive divisions are made elsewhere — by *severity* (mild, moderate, severe, graded from consciousness) and by *pathology* (focal versus diffuse) — and those cut across the indexed types (Saatman et al., 2008).

- Brain concussion — the mildest and commonest form, a transient disturbance of brain function after a blow or jolt, typically with brief or no loss of consciousness and normal structural imaging. Its symptoms are overwhelmingly cognitive and somatic — slowed thinking, difficulty concentrating, headache — and usually resolve over days to weeks, though a minority of cases persist (Carroll et al., 2004).

- Brain contusion — a bruise of the brain, a focal region of damaged and bleeding tissue where the brain has struck the inside of the skull. Contusions cluster at the frontal and temporal poles regardless of where the head was hit, because of the shape of the skull's interior, which is one reason frontal-lobe deficits are so characteristic of TBI (McAllister, 2011).

- Chronic traumatic encephalopathy — a progressive neurodegenerative disease associated with a history of repetitive head impacts, defined pathologically by a distinctive pattern of tau protein deposition and diagnosed with certainty only after death. It represents the long-term, cumulative end of the injury spectrum rather than the consequence of any single event (McKee et al., 2013).

These three indexed types sit among a broader clinical vocabulary the reader will meet — diffuse axonal injury, subdural and epidural haematoma, penetrating injury — but only concussion, contusion, and chronic traumatic encephalopathy carry their own MeSH descriptors within the traumatic branch. Table 1 sets out the severity grading that does most of the clinical work, because it is severity, defined from consciousness, that predicts outcome.

Table 1

Severity Grading of Traumatic Brain Injury by Consciousness and Amnesia

Severity Glasgow Coma Scale Loss of consciousness Post-traumatic amnesia
Mild 13–15 0–30 minutes Under 24 hours
Moderate 9–12 30 minutes to 24 hours 1 to 7 days
Severe 3–8 Over 24 hours More than 7 days

How Injury Damages Cognition

The reason TBI produces such a consistent cognitive profile lies in the physics of the injury and the architecture it strikes. When the head is suddenly accelerated or decelerated, the brain moves within the skull, and two things follow. The frontal and temporal lobes are driven against the bony ridges at the front and base of the skull, so focal contusions concentrate there whatever the direction of the blow — and these are exactly the regions that support executive function and memory (McAllister, 2011). At the same time, rotational forces set up shearing strains deep in the white matter, stretching and tearing the long axons that carry signals between regions. This *diffuse axonal injury* is the signature lesion of TBI, and it is often invisible on ordinary scans even when it is severe (Sharp et al., 2014).

Demo 2 — Diffuse axonal injury as disconnection

Cognition depends on communication among distant regions. Diffuse axonal injury shears the longest tracts first, sparing the regions themselves. Drag the severity up and watch the long connections break and the network’s global efficiency — how well information can still travel across it — collapse.

network global efficiency
Global efficiency: 100% of the intact network. Every region is well connected; information travels freely.

Global efficiency is the mean of 1/(shortest path) over all region pairs, normalised to the intact network; schematic after the network-dysfunction account of Sharp, Scott, and Leech (2014).

The consequence is best understood in the language of networks. Cognition does not reside in single regions but in the coordinated activity of distributed networks, and the long tracts that diffuse axonal injury severs are precisely the connections that bind those networks together. Diffusion imaging shows that the integrity of these white-matter tracts predicts cognitive performance after injury: the more the connections are disrupted, the slower and less controlled the thinking (Kinnunen et al., 2011). Graph measures capture this directly — the network's *global efficiency*, a summary of how short the communication paths between regions remain, falls as tracts are cut, and that fall tracks the cognitive slowing. This is why TBI so reliably slows processing speed and impairs attention — functions that depend on the rapid, integrated communication a damaged network can no longer sustain. The default mode network, in particular, is disrupted in a way that tracks the failure of attentional control (Sharp et al., 2014).

The Cognitive Cost of Injury

The cognitive sequelae of TBI form a recognisable syndrome. Across studies, the domains most consistently affected are attention, speed of information processing, learning and memory, and executive function — the capacity to plan, inhibit, and flexibly control behaviour (Rabinowitz & Levin, 2014), (Dikmen et al., 2009). These are not random; they are exactly the functions supported by the frontal lobes and the distributed networks that the injury preferentially damages. A person may score normally on tests of vocabulary and general knowledge — abilities that draw on distributed, over-learned stores — while failing badly at holding a goal in mind against distraction, or at doing anything quickly (Stuss, 2011).

Executive dysfunction deserves special emphasis because it is both the most disabling and the hardest to measure. Frontal-lobe damage can leave standard IQ intact yet devastate the ability to organise behaviour in the real world — to start a task, resist a distraction, switch strategies, and monitor one's own performance (Stuss, 2011). Donald Stuss's work made the case that the frontal lobes are not one faculty but several dissociable control processes, so that different injuries produce different executive profiles rather than a single global deficit. The cognitive cost of TBI is thus not a uniform dimming but a targeted erosion of the brain's control and integration machinery (Rabinowitz & Levin, 2014).

Demo 3 — Recovery depends on initial severity

The injured brain reorganises over months, but how far it recovers depends heavily on how severe the injury was. Move the slider to a month after injury and read the recovered cognitive function for each severity — mild injuries approach their old level, severe ones plateau well below it.

0%25%50%75%100%06121824months since injury
Mild: 96%Moderate: 69%Severe: 42%
At 6 months post-injury, modelled cognitive function stands at 96% (mild), 69% (moderate), and 42% (severe) of premorbid level. The gap between the curves widens with severity and persists: recovery is real but bounded, and the ceiling is set early.

Illustrative saturating recovery curves after the severity-graded outcome and plasticity literature (Dikmen et al., 2009; Nudo, 2013); values show the characteristic shape, not clinical norms.

Recovery adds a further dimension. The injured brain is not static: over weeks and months it can reorganise, as spared circuits take on functions and rehabilitation shapes that neuroplasticity (Nudo, 2013). The trajectory depends heavily on initial severity — mild injuries typically recover substantially, severe ones incompletely — and cognitive rehabilitation aims to exploit this window, training compensatory strategies and restoring what the plastic brain will allow (Rabinowitz & Levin, 2014).

Worked Example

How is the severity of a brain injury put into a single number at the bedside? The standard tool is the *Glasgow Coma Scale* (GCS), devised by Teasdale and Jennett to bring order to the vague descriptions such as *semi-conscious* or *stuporous* that once made head-injury reports impossible to compare (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). The scale rates three independent behaviours, each on its own ordinal scale, and sums them:

$$\text{GCS} = E + V + M$$

where eye-opening $E$ runs from 1 (none) to 4 (spontaneous), verbal response $V$ from 1 (none) to 5 (oriented), and motor response $M$ from 1 (none) to 6 (obeys commands). The total therefore ranges from 3 (no response on any axis) to 15 (fully alert).

Consider a patient who opens her eyes when spoken to ($E = 3$), is confused but conversational ($V = 4$), and localises to a painful stimulus rather than obeying a command ($M = 5$). Her score is:

$$\text{GCS} = 3 + 4 + 5 = 12$$

A total of 12 places her at the upper edge of the *moderate* band (9–12), just below the mild range (13–15). The GCS captures depth of impaired consciousness at a moment; its natural complement is the *duration* of impaired memory afterward, the post-traumatic amnesia measured by structured instruments such as the Galveston Orientation and Amnesia Test, whose length is among the best predictors of eventual outcome (Levin et al., 1979). The clinical logic of the scale rewards close reading. Its power is that three simple, reliably observed behaviours combine into a number that predicts outcome and can be tracked over time — a falling GCS is an emergency. But summing three ordinal scales into one total also discards information: a GCS of 10 reached as $E4\,V1\,M5$ (a patient who is eyes-open and moving but not speaking) is a very different picture from $E2\,V3\,M5$, though the totals are close. For this reason the component profile ($E$, $V$, $M$) is now reported alongside the sum, a recognition that a single number, however useful, compresses away distinctions that matter — the same tension between a convenient composite and its informative parts that runs through all of psychometrics (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974).

Demo 1 — Scoring the Glasgow Coma Scale

The GCS grades a head injury by summing three independently observed behaviours. Set each response and watch the total, and its severity band, update. The defaults reproduce the worked example (E3, V4, M5 = 12).

368912131512
GCS 12/15 — Moderate. An intermediate score: consciousness is clearly impaired and the injury warrants close monitoring. The same total can arise from different profiles (E3 V4 M5), which is why the components are reported alongside the sum.

Glasgow Coma Scale after Teasdale and Jennett (1974); band cut-offs are the conventional mild (13–15), moderate (9–12), and severe (3–8) ranges.

Discussion

The scientific interest of TBI for cognitive psychology is that it is a natural experiment in disconnection. Where a stroke or a tumour destroys a defined region and teaches us what that place does, diffuse axonal injury does something subtler: it leaves the regions largely intact but cuts the wires between them, and the resulting deficits reveal how much of cognition depends on *communication* rather than on any single centre (Sharp et al., 2014). The reliable slowing of processing speed and the erosion of attentional control after TBI are, in this light, the predictable signature of a network whose long-range integration has been degraded — a lesson about the architecture of the healthy mind drawn from the pattern of its failure (Kinnunen et al., 2011).

The demonstrations on this page track that idea at three resolutions. The network display shows how severing long connections, while sparing the nodes, collapses a system's capacity to integrate information; the recovery display shows how outcome depends on initial severity and unfolds over time as the brain reorganises; and the coma-scale calculator shows how a clinical severity grade is extracted from three simple behavioural observations. Where the account remains open is at the boundary between injury and disease. It is now clear that a single moderate-to-severe TBI raises the long-term risk of neurodegeneration, and that repetitive impacts can produce chronic traumatic encephalopathy, but the mechanisms linking a mechanical event decades earlier to a progressive tauopathy are only beginning to be understood (McKee et al., 2013), (Wilson et al., 2017).

Cognitive Implications

The clearest cognitive lesson of TBI is that the brain's most vulnerable functions are also its most distinctly human ones. It is not the ancient, well-buffered systems — basic perception, over-learned language, long-term factual memory — that fail most readily, but the frontal executive functions that let a person hold a goal, resist a distraction, and adapt a plan (Stuss, 2011). A patient can emerge from a severe injury able to converse fluently and recall the distant past, yet be unable to organise a morning, hold a train of thought against interruption, or judge the social effect of what they say. This dissociation — spared knowledge, shattered control — is one of the strongest pieces of evidence that executive function is a distinct cognitive system rather than a by-product of general intelligence (Rabinowitz & Levin, 2014).

A second implication concerns the time-course of cognition itself. Because so much of what TBI damages is *speed* — the rate at which information is moved and integrated across a now-degraded network — many of its consequences are best understood as a tax on processing that cascades into every downstream function (Dikmen et al., 2009). A person who thinks more slowly will also seem to have worse memory and poorer attention, not because those systems are independently damaged but because they are starved of the rapid throughput they require. This is why processing speed is treated as a cardinal measure in TBI assessment, and why rehabilitation that restores or compensates for lost speed can ripple outward into apparently unrelated domains (Nudo, 2013). TBI thus reframes an apparent memory problem or attention problem as, often, a problem of the network's bandwidth.

Current Directions

Three fronts are active. The first is the reconception of TBI as a *chronic, evolving condition* rather than a discrete event. Long-term follow-up shows that the neurological and cognitive consequences of a serious injury continue to change for years — sometimes improving, sometimes declining — and that a single TBI is a recognised risk factor for later dementia, which has turned survivorship and long-term monitoring into central research questions (Wilson et al., 2017), (Stocchetti & Zanier, 2016). The second is *network neuroimaging*: diffusion and functional imaging now let researchers map the specific disconnections behind a person's deficits, moving the field from grading global severity toward explaining an individual's cognitive profile from their pattern of damaged connections (Sharp et al., 2014), (Kinnunen et al., 2011).

The third front is *large-scale, harmonised research*. Because TBI is so heterogeneous, individual studies have struggled to find treatments that generalise, and the international response has been to pool data across centres and countries under common definitions and outcome measures — the approach set out by the InTBIR initiative and the Lancet Neurology Commission (Maas et al., 2017). Across all three fronts the shift is the same: from treating TBI as a single acute lesion to be graded, toward treating it as a heterogeneous, network-level, lifelong condition whose cognitive consequences must be measured, explained, and managed over time (Blennow et al., 2016).

Common Misconceptions

A brain injury always involves a loss of consciousness.
No. Most traumatic brain injuries are mild, and many involve no loss of consciousness at all — a period of confusion or a gap in memory for the event is enough to meet the definition, and measurable cognitive change can follow even so (Menon et al., 2010), (Carroll et al., 2004).
A normal brain scan means there is no injury.
Not so. The signature lesion of TBI, diffuse axonal injury, is a shearing of microscopic axons that ordinary CT and standard MRI often cannot see. A person can have a normal scan and a genuine, disabling injury to the brain's connections (Sharp et al., 2014).
A mild traumatic brain injury means the effects are minor.
Mild refers to the initial severity — a high Glasgow Coma Scale, brief or no loss of consciousness — not to the outcome. A minority of mild injuries produce persistent cognitive symptoms, and the sheer number of mild cases makes them a large public-health burden (McInnes et al., 2017), (Carroll et al., 2004).
Once the acute injury heals, recovery is complete.
Not necessarily. The consequences of a serious TBI can evolve for years, and a single injury raises the long-term risk of neurodegeneration. TBI is increasingly viewed as a chronic condition rather than a one-off event with a fixed endpoint (Wilson et al., 2017).

Glossary

Brain concussion.
The mildest and commonest traumatic brain injury: a transient disturbance of brain function after a blow or jolt, usually with normal imaging and cognitive symptoms that resolve over days to weeks.
Brain contusion.
A bruise of the brain — a focal region of damaged, bleeding tissue — clustering at the frontal and temporal poles where the brain strikes the skull's interior.
Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE).
A progressive neurodegenerative disease associated with repetitive head impacts, defined by a distinctive pattern of tau deposition and confirmed only at autopsy.
Cognitive rehabilitation.
Structured therapy after brain injury that trains compensatory strategies and retrains impaired functions, aiming to exploit the brain's capacity for reorganisation and restore everyday performance.
Diffuse axonal injury.
Widespread shearing and tearing of the brain's long axons by rotational forces; the signature lesion of TBI, often invisible on standard scans, that disconnects rather than destroys.
Executive function.
The set of control processes — planning, inhibition, working memory, and flexible switching — supported by the frontal lobes, and among the faculties most reliably impaired by TBI.
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS).
A bedside measure of consciousness summing eye-opening (1–4), verbal (1–5), and motor (1–6) responses to a total of 3–15, used to grade injury severity.
Global efficiency.
A graph measure of how short, on average, the communication paths between regions of a brain network remain; it falls as white-matter tracts are severed and tracks the cognitive slowing after injury.
Neuroplasticity.
The brain's capacity to reorganise its connections and functions in response to experience or injury; the basis on which spared circuits take on lost functions and rehabilitation restores performance.
Post-traumatic amnesia.
The period after injury during which a person cannot form continuous new memories; its duration is one of the best predictors of injury severity and outcome.
Primary injury.
The tissue damage caused at the instant of impact — contusion and axonal shearing — which cannot be reversed, only prevented.
Processing speed.
The rate at which the brain takes in and acts on information; a cardinal casualty of TBI, whose slowing cascades into apparent memory and attention deficits.
Secondary injury.
The cascade of swelling, disturbed blood flow, excitotoxicity, and inflammation that unfolds over hours to days after impact, and the main target of acute treatment.
Traumatic brain injury (TBI).
An alteration in brain function, or other evidence of brain pathology, caused by an external mechanical force.

Key Researchers

Bryan Jennett

(1926–2008). British neurosurgeon at the University of Glasgow who, with Graham Teasdale, devised the Glasgow Coma Scale and later helped define the persistent vegetative state, shaping how impaired consciousness is measured and described. Wikipedia

Ann McKee

Neuropathologist at Boston University School of Medicine whose work defined the pathological staging of chronic traumatic encephalopathy from repetitive head impact, establishing the disease's distinctive tau signature. ORCID

David K. Menon

Neurocritical-care researcher at the University of Cambridge, co-author of the consensus definition of traumatic brain injury and co-lead of the InTBIR initiative and Lancet Neurology Commission on TBI. ORCID

Jennie Ponsford

Clinical neuropsychologist at Monash University whose research established evidence-based cognitive rehabilitation and the long-term measurement of outcome after traumatic brain injury. ORCID

David J. Sharp

Neurologist at Imperial College London and the UK Dementia Research Institute who showed that diffuse white-matter damage disrupts large-scale brain networks, linking axonal injury to cognitive impairment. ORCID

Douglas H. Smith

Director of the Center for Brain Injury and Repair at the University of Pennsylvania, whose work on the biomechanics and pathology of diffuse axonal injury connects the mechanics of impact to chronic neurodegeneration. ORCID

Donald T. Stuss

(1941–2019). Canadian neuropsychologist at the University of Toronto whose work mapped the frontal-lobe contributions to executive function and attention that are central to understanding the cognitive sequelae of brain injury. Wikidata

Graham Teasdale

Neurosurgeon at the University of Glasgow who, with Bryan Jennett, devised the Glasgow Coma Scale, the worldwide standard for grading impaired consciousness after head injury. Wikipedia

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a traumatic brain injury?

It is a disruption of normal brain function caused by an external mechanical force, such as a blow, a jolt, or a penetrating object. It differs from injuries that arise inside the brain, such as a stroke or a tumour, and it ranges from a mild concussion to a severe, life-threatening injury.

How is the severity of a brain injury measured?

Severity is graded from the depth and duration of altered consciousness, not from the size of any lesion. The Glasgow Coma Scale rates eye, verbal, and motor responses to give a score from 3 to 15, and the length of post-traumatic amnesia, the gap in continuous memory after the injury, is another key measure.

What cognitive problems does a brain injury cause?

The functions most reliably affected are attention, speed of thinking, learning and memory, and executive function, meaning the ability to plan, concentrate, and control behaviour. General knowledge and vocabulary are often preserved, because the injury falls hardest on the frontal lobes and the connections that coordinate the brain.

Can a brain injury be present with a normal scan?

Yes. The characteristic damage in TBI is diffuse axonal injury, a shearing of microscopic nerve fibres that standard CT and MRI often cannot show. A person can have a normal scan and still have a genuine injury to the brain's connections.

Is a concussion a real brain injury?

Yes. A concussion is a mild traumatic brain injury. Although its effects usually resolve over days to weeks and it leaves no visible mark on a scan, it is a genuine disruption of brain function, and a minority of concussions cause persistent symptoms.

Does the brain recover after a traumatic brain injury?

It can, to varying degrees. The brain reorganises after injury, and rehabilitation exploits this plasticity. How much recovery occurs depends heavily on the initial severity: mild injuries often recover substantially, while severe injuries typically leave lasting deficits.

What is chronic traumatic encephalopathy?

It is a progressive neurodegenerative disease associated with a history of repeated head impacts, such as those in contact sports. It is defined by a distinctive build-up of tau protein in the brain and can at present be diagnosed with certainty only after death.

Why does thinking feel slower after a brain injury?

Much of what a brain injury damages is the brain's ability to move and integrate information quickly across its networks. When processing speed falls, everything that depends on it, such as following a conversation, remembering, and staying focused, becomes harder, so a single loss of speed can look like several separate problems.

Support Organizations

Brain Injury Association of America (BIAA) — information, resources, and advocacy for people affected by brain injury. (United States)

Headway — the Brain Injury Association — support, rehabilitation services, and information for survivors of brain injury and their families. (United Kingdom)

National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) — federal source of information on traumatic brain injury and neurological research. (United States)

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