Abstract

Consciousness is a type of cognition: the sense of awareness of oneself and one's surroundings, which MeSH also files under psychophysiology. Researchers separate its level, running from coma through sleep to alert wakefulness, from its contents, the particular things experienced at a given moment. It is studied by contrasting conscious with unconscious processing of stimuli, by asking whether report itself contaminates the evidence, and by searching for the minimal brain activity that accompanies an experience. Clinical work on coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state shows that behaviour can understate awareness and has produced brain-based indices of the level of consciousness. Three interactive demonstrations map levels against contents, simulate visibility in the attentional blink and illustrate a perturbational complexity index.

Keywords: consciousness, neural correlates of consciousness, global workspace, integrated information, disorders of consciousness

Consciousness resists study because the thing to be explained is experienced from the inside. Nagel (1974) argued that consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem intractable, since reductive explanations of mind leave out exactly what is distinctive about having experience at all. Chalmers (1996) devoted a book to the search for a fundamental theory of the conscious mind. Earlier, Dennett (1991) had published a book whose title, Consciousness explained, announced the ambition to explain consciousness.

A second difficulty is that one word covers several things. Block (1995) argued that researchers routinely run together phenomenal consciousness, the felt quality of an experience, and access consciousness, the availability of information for reasoning, report and the control of action. He discussed blindsight in this connection, observing that stimuli in a blind field lack both kinds of consciousness. Much of the modern experimental agenda, from the design of no-report tasks to the debate over the frontal cortex, turns on keeping such distinctions apart. The sibling article on awareness treats the related notion of knowing about a particular object or event.

Key Takeaways

  • The level of consciousness, how awake a person is, and its contents, what the person experiences, can come apart: a review of the vegetative state describes wakefulness with no sign of awareness.
  • The neural correlates of consciousness, the minimal brain activity that goes with a particular experience, are still disputed between a posterior cortical hot zone and the prefrontal cortex, and the question is argued in exchanges where each side presents its own case.
  • No-report paradigms, experiments that infer experience without asking for a report, try to separate consciousness from the act of reporting it, though both report-based and no-report designs have drawbacks.
  • Global neuronal workspace theory, which ties conscious access to network-wide ignition, and integrated information theory, which equates consciousness with integrated information, each received only partial support in a preregistered adversarial test with 256 participants; all six theories discussed here remain contested.
  • Willful modulation of brain activity, detected by imaging, appeared in 5 of 54 patients with disorders of consciousness in one study (in two of them no voluntary behaviour could be detected at the bedside), only one of whom used it to answer questions, and bedside communication remained impossible.
  • The perturbational complexity index, a score of how richly the cortex responds to magnetic stimulation, told conscious states apart from unconscious ones in a 52-subject study, and a cut-off for it was later validated in a larger benchmark group, though its validators did not offer it as a predictor of recovery.

What Consciousness Is

Sense of awareness of self and of the environment.

Scope note for the MeSH descriptor Consciousness (D003243), U.S. National Library of Medicine.

Two dimensions organise most scientific talk about consciousness. The first is its level: whether, and how far, a person is awake and responsive, a dimension bound up with wakefulness and physiological arousal. The second is its contents: the sights, sounds, thoughts and feelings that fill experience at a given moment. In ordinary life the two rise and fall together, which is why they are easy to conflate.

The clearest evidence that they are separable comes from the clinic. Laureys (2005) reviewed functional neuroimaging of the vegetative state, a condition in which patients show wakefulness without awareness, considering the roles of primary sensory cortices and associative areas and setting the vegetative state beside the minimally conscious state. A European task force later proposed that the vegetative state be renamed unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (Laureys et al., 2010). A patient can be awake in the sense of level while giving no sign of conscious contents.

Consciousness must also be told apart from attention. Koch and Tsuchiya (2007) reviewed psychophysical evidence that top-down attention and consciousness can be dissociated, drawing on cases such as perception of the gist of a scene, and concluded that they are two distinct brain processes. Their review did not report effect sizes, so the claim rests on the pattern of dissociations rather than on a pooled estimate. Other researchers disagreed: they held that awareness required attention, even though attention alone could not produce it, rejected the claimed double dissociation, and concluded that the evidence did not show awareness arising without attention (Cohen et al., 2012). Block's (1995) separation of phenomenal from access consciousness adds a distinction that cuts across the other two.

The first demonstration places familiar states on a map with level of consciousness on one axis and the richness of conscious contents on the other. Selecting a state such as dreaming, general anaesthesia or the vegetative state shows where it is usually placed. The placements are schematic and illustrative, not data.

Demo 1: where does each state sit on level and contents?

level (wakefulness, arousal)richness of contents
Alert wakefulness. Fully awake and richly aware of self and surroundings.

Placements are schematic, chosen to show that level and contents can come apart (as in dreaming and the vegetative state). They are not measured values.

Figure 1

Level and Contents of Consciousness

States of consciousness placed by level of arousal and richness of experience A schematic plot. The horizontal axis is the level of arousal, from low to high; the vertical axis is the richness of conscious experience. Alert wakefulness sits at the top right. Dreaming sits high on experience but low on arousal. Deep sleep, anaesthesia and coma sit near the bottom left. The vegetative state sits at moderate arousal but near the bottom, wakeful without signs of awareness, and the minimally conscious state sits just above it. alert wakefulness dreaming deep sleep anaesthesia coma vegetative state minimally conscious state level of arousal richness of experience
Note. An original schematic, not data. Positions are approximate and chosen only to show that the level of consciousness and its contents can come apart.

Studying Consciousness

The workhorse method is contrastive analysis: compare brain activity when a stimulus is consciously perceived with activity when it goes unperceived, and attribute the difference to consciousness. Aru and colleagues argued that this subtraction is confounded, because the difference can also contain processes that are prerequisites of an experience and processes that are its consequences (Aru et al., 2012). They judged that earlier results cannot be interpreted unequivocally, yet they kept the contrastive method, calling it still valid and valuable once its confounds are handled.

Report is one of the largest of those confounds. When participants must signal what they saw, the recorded brain activity includes the machinery of reporting as well as the experience itself. Tsuchiya and colleagues therefore argued for no-report paradigms, in which conscious contents are inferred without an explicit response, as a route to the neural correlates of phenomenal experience (Tsuchiya et al., 2015). They acknowledged that report-based and no-report designs each carry disadvantages, so neither type settles the question alone.

The attentional blink, a lapse in detecting a second target shown shortly after a first, offers a way to ask whether consciousness comes in degrees. In a behavioural study, Sergent and Dehaene (2004) had participants rate the visibility of target words on a continuous scale. The ratings did not spread across the scale as a gradual process would predict; they clustered as though each word was either seen or missed. A nonlinear bifurcation in brain activity was offered only as a suggested explanation for this all-or-none pattern. Not every study found an all-or-none pattern. Overgaard and colleagues compared different ways for observers to report what they saw in a visual task and concluded that conscious perception came in degrees rather than being simply present or absent, a result that ran against the dichotomous finding above (Overgaard et al., 2006).

Dehaene and colleagues proposed a taxonomy sorting processing into subliminal, preconscious and conscious kinds with reference to vigilance and top-down amplification (Dehaene et al., 2006). They linked conscious access to late surges of activity across parietal and frontal regions and offered the scheme as a way to reconcile neuroimaging findings that appeared inconsistent; its mapping onto specific mechanisms was put forward as a suggestion rather than demonstrated.

Neurological cases supply a natural contrast between processing and experience. Weiskrantz and colleagues studied visual capacity in the hemianopic field of a patient after a restricted occipital lesion (Weiskrantz et al., 1974), work on the phenomenon known as blindsight.

The timing of volition raised a different question: whether conscious intention starts a voluntary act. Libet and colleagues recorded the readiness potential, a build-up of brain activity before self-initiated movement, in 5 subjects, each tested in at least six sessions, while they reported when they had first become aware of the intention to move by recalling the position of a revolving spot on a clock (Libet et al., 1983). The brain activity began before the reported intention. The study was small, the time of awareness was judged from recall alone, and one class of readiness potentials included preplanning; the authors nonetheless concluded that a spontaneous voluntary act can begin in the brain before any recallable awareness of a decision to act (Libet et al., 1983). A later computational model, tested in two EEG experiments, reinterpreted the readiness potential as the build-up of spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations that happened to cross a threshold, rather than as a sign of planning; the experiments used only a weak imperative condition (Schurger et al., 2012).

The second demonstration simulates attentional-blink trials. Setting the lag between the two targets shows simulated visibility ratings that either cluster at the extremes, the all-or-none pattern, or spread across the scale, the graded pattern. The data are seeded and illustrative, not results from any study.

Demo 2: are blinked targets seen all-or-none or by degrees?

not seenclearly seen
Ratings pile up at the two ends: on each trial the second target was either fully seen or missed, and the lag mainly changes how often each happens.

Simulated ratings for 300 trials, seeded and illustrative. The comparison mirrors the question asked of attentional-blink visibility reports; the numbers are not data.

Neural Correlates of Consciousness

Crick and Koch (2003) summarised their approach to the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, the minimal brain activity that accompanies a specific experience, as a framework. Writing about visual consciousness, they set out their proposals under ten headings, among them the idea that conscious contents correspond to competing assemblies of cells. They acknowledged that most of the ideas had been suggested before and that some aspects of the brain were left out. A review of the neural correlates of consciousness in humans from the same period surveyed the human evidence (Rees et al., 2002).

By the middle of the 2010s, one review located the correlates of conscious experience mainly in a posterior cortical hot zone (Koch et al., 2016). The same review reported that some candidate markers of consciousness had proved illusory, and it attributed the involvement of the fronto-parietal network largely to monitoring and reporting rather than to experience itself.

That attribution is contested. In a paired exchange, Boly and colleagues set out the case on whether the correlates lie in the front or the back of the cerebral cortex, asking how frontal and posterior regions contribute to consciousness and its contents (Boly et al., 2017). Odegaard and colleagues defended a role for the prefrontal cortex, arguing that null findings come from insensitive methods and from conflating subjective experience with the capacity to perform a task, and they identified three misconceptions in the critique (Odegaard et al., 2017). Each paper argues one side of a dual-perspectives debate, so neither is a neutral summary.

Subcortical structures enter the debate too. Work on anaesthesia has asked whether the thalamus acts as a switch for consciousness or merely as a readout of cortical state, while noting that thalamic effects may be indirect (Alkire et al., 2008).

Theories of Consciousness

Many theories claim to explain consciousness. Six are prominent in current neuroscience, and none is settled; each is described below with its standing.

Global neuronal workspace theory holds that information becomes conscious when it becomes globally available to many cognitive processes at once. Its cognitive ancestor is the global workspace idea set out in a book on a cognitive theory of consciousness (Baars, 1988). Dehaene and Naccache (2001) gave it a neural form, resting the proposal on three empirical observations and invoking workspace neurons and top-down attentional amplification; the prefrontal and anterior cingulate role was inferred, and the theory's novel predictions had not yet been tested. Later reviews tied conscious access to ignition, a prefronto-parietal surge accompanied by synchronisation in the beta and gamma bands (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), and recast that ignition as a network event linked to attention, working memory and general anaesthesia (Mashour et al., 2020). The theory's scope is conscious access, the transition into consciousness, rather than every aspect of experience. Its standing is contested: in a preregistered adversarial test it received only partial support, with no ignition at stimulus offset and limited representation of some stimulus dimensions in prefrontal cortex (Cogitate Consortium, 2025).

Integrated information theory starts from experience rather than from function. Tononi (2004) proposed that consciousness is the capacity of a system to integrate information, quantified as phi (Φ), with the amount of integration fixing the quantity of consciousness and its structure fixing the quality; the argument relied on thought experiments and simplified simulated networks. A later statement derives the properties a physical substrate must have from the properties of experience, defining it by intrinsic cause-effect power, and notes that it leads to some counterintuitive predictions and holds that, in principle, it can settle both how much experience a system has and what that experience is like (Tononi et al., 2016). Only small, simulated systems, for now, allow Φ to be measured rigorously (Alkire et al., 2008). The theory remains contested: the same adversarial test gave it partial support while failing to find the sustained posterior synchronisation it predicted (Cogitate Consortium, 2025). A purely theoretical critique, the unfolding argument, offered no new data but contended that theories grounding consciousness in causal structure, integrated information theory and recurrent processing theory among them, were either wrong or beyond the reach of science (Doerig et al., 2019).

Higher-order theories of consciousness hold that a mental state is conscious when it is the object of a suitable higher-order representation. Lau and Rosenthal (2011) argued that the approach, which began in philosophy, had become testable and had substantial empirical support, and they defended it against criticisms based on prefrontal activity. Brown et al. later argued that the approach is often misread and that its demands are lighter than critics assume; most proponents, they noted, reject the equation of consciousness with metacognition (Brown et al., 2019). The theories remain contested, and their fate is tied to the prefrontal debate described above (Boly et al., 2017; Odegaard et al., 2017).

Recurrent processing theory is a first-order rival to higher-order and workspace views, tying visual awareness to local recurrent processing (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Brown et al., 2019). Lamme (2006) argued that consciousness should be defined in neural terms, a move he acknowledged requires abandoning some intuitive psychological notions, and illustrated it with an example from visual neuroscience. Its standing is contested: one major review grouped it with re-entry and predictive processing theories and judged it unclear how the theories interrelate and whether they can be distinguished empirically (Seth & Bayne, 2022).

Attention schema theory takes a different route. Graziano and Kastner (2011) proposed that awareness is a representation of one's own attentional state, constructed by the same machinery that supports social perception and theory of mind, and they set it against the view that consciousness is an emergent property; the proposal had not been tested directly. Its standing is contested, like that of its rivals: a review of 13 influential theories argued that the field has too many theories and needs hard empirical criteria to judge them (Doerig et al., 2021).

Predictive processing draws on predictive coding and the idea of a Bayesian brain. Seth (2013) applied it to the body, proposing that emotion arises from predictive inference about interoception, the sensing of the body's internal state, and linking that inference to body ownership and conscious selfhood; the paper was a conceptual proposal. Predictive processing remains contested as an approach to consciousness: it is one of four families of theory whose relations to each other are unresolved (Seth & Bayne, 2022).

Testing the Theories

The proliferation of theories is itself a problem. Doerig and colleagues argued that there are too many theories of consciousness and proposed a checklist of empirical criteria, applying it to 13 of the most influential (Doerig et al., 2021). They took a strictly empirical standpoint, so the checklist does not weigh philosophical arguments for or against any theory.

Methods may matter more than theories in deciding what a study finds. The ConTraSt database compiled 412 experiments bearing on four leading theories, and the theory a study ended up supporting could be predicted from its methodological choices alone (Yaron et al., 2022). Most of the studies interpreted their results after the fact instead of testing predictions stated in advance, which suggests that method choices may bias the conclusions drawn.

Adversarial collaboration was designed to break that pattern. Proponents of global neuronal workspace theory and integrated information theory agreed on opposing predictions in advance, and 256 participants were tested with functional magnetic resonance imaging, magnetoencephalography and intracranial electroencephalography (Cogitate Consortium, 2025). Key tenets of both theories were substantially challenged. Integrated information theory's prediction of sustained synchronisation in posterior cortex failed, as did the workspace prediction of ignition when a stimulus disappeared, and prefrontal cortex carried only limited information about some stimulus dimensions; each theory received partial support. A broader review concluded that how the main theories relate to each other, and whether experiments can tell them apart, remains unclear (Seth & Bayne, 2022).

Sleep, Dreaming and Anaesthesia

Natural and drug-induced changes in the level of consciousness give researchers a way to see what changes in the brain when experience fades. In an experiment combining transcranial magnetic stimulation with high-density electroencephalography, Massimini and colleagues found that during non-rapid eye movement sleep the response to stimulation no longer propagated across the cortex as it did during wakefulness, a breakdown of cortical effective connectivity (Massimini et al., 2005). The authors said only that this breakdown may be related to the fading of consciousness, and stimulation was applied at a single premotor site.

Sleep is not uniformly unconscious, since people woken from it sometimes report dreams. Using high-density recordings and repeated awakenings, Siclari and colleagues linked dreaming to a decrease in low-frequency activity over posterior cortex, in the region described as a hot zone for conscious experience (Siclari et al., 2017). Whether a sleeper was dreaming could be predicted in real time during non-rapid eye movement sleep.

General anaesthesia reliably induces unresponsiveness, and a review by Alkire and colleagues argued that it causes unconsciousness by disrupting cortical integration and the brain's capacity for information (Alkire et al., 2008). The review drew on measures such as electroencephalography, the bispectral index monitor and the isolated forearm technique, and it discussed intraoperative awareness. Its caveats bear on any clinical reading: unresponsiveness is not the same as unconsciousness, and theories other than integrated information theory can also accommodate the anaesthesia evidence.

A later review of the return of consciousness separated the correlates of particular contents from the full set of correlates and from the capacity for consciousness itself, and reconsidered the role of frontal regions (Storm et al., 2017).

Disorders of Consciousness

Severe brain injury can leave consciousness reduced or absent for long periods, and the disorders of consciousness form a graded clinical series. Teasdale and Jennett (1974) introduced a practical scale for assessing coma and impaired consciousness at the bedside, the Glasgow Coma Scale.

Between coma and recovery lie the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state. A consensus group defined the minimally conscious state and distinguished it from coma and from the vegetative state (Giacino et al., 2002). The criteria were behavioural and agreed by consensus, because there were insufficient data for evidence-based guidelines, and the group regarded differences in prognosis between the states as preliminary.

Behaviour can miss awareness. Owen and colleagues asked a 23-year-old woman who met criteria for the vegetative state after a traumatic brain injury to imagine playing tennis or moving through her home while she lay in a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner, and compared her brain responses with those of 12 healthy volunteers; the imaging showed that she was aware and following commands (Owen et al., 2006). The study involved a single patient, and the authors warned that a negative result would not prove a patient unaware, since false negatives occur even in healthy people.

A larger study across two sites applied imagery tasks to 54 patients with disorders of consciousness (Monti et al., 2010). Five showed willful modulation of brain activity. Only one used the imagery to answer yes-or-no questions, and communication at the bedside remained impossible for that patient. In three of the five, bedside testing then found some sign of awareness, and in the other two no voluntary behaviour could be detected, so covert awareness was confined to a small minority of the sample (Monti et al., 2010).

Recovery is uncertain. A review of recovery from disorders of consciousness concluded that covert consciousness can be detected with advanced neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques and that early evidence suggests detecting it in intensive care may forecast how well a patient recovers, while stressing that it remains unclear which patients will recover and that emerging therapies show only potential (Edlow et al., 2021). A European Academy of Neurology guideline, prepared by a panel from 10 European countries using GRADE, recommended multimodal evaluation, drawing on behavioural scales such as the Coma Recovery Scale – Revised and the Full Outline of Unresponsiveness score alongside EEG, positron emission tomography and resting-state functional imaging (Kondziella et al., 2020). The panel judged the diagnostic evidence limited but accumulating.

Measuring Consciousness

The clinical problem calls for a measure that does not depend on the patient's ability to respond. The perturbational complexity index uses the same pairing of transcranial magnetic stimulation and high-density electroencephalography as the sleep experiment described above (Massimini et al., 2005). A magnetic pulse perturbs the cortex, the recorded response is compressed with a Lempel-Ziv complexity measure, and the resulting score reflects how integrated and differentiated the response is (Casali et al., 2013). Across 208 sessions in 52 subjects, 32 healthy and 20 with brain injuries, the index separated conscious from unconscious states, in comparisons spanning wakefulness, NREM sleep, sedation, the vegetative state, the minimally conscious state and locked-in syndrome. Part of the data came from previously published studies, the patient group was small (20 patients), the REM sleep data came from one subject, and the effects of stimulation site and intensity were not significant; the authors called for testing in an independent, larger sample. A later validation study derived a cut-off from the data, PCI* = 0.31, which divided conscious from unconscious conditions with 100% sensitivity and specificity in a benchmark group of 150 people, healthy controls together with patients who had brain injuries; when it was applied to 81 patients with disorders of consciousness, it identified 36 of 38 in a minimally conscious state and found high complexity in 9 of 43 in a vegetative state (Casarotto et al., 2016). The authors described the cut-off as an operational threshold, not an absolute boundary, and did not put it forward as a marker of prognosis (Casarotto et al., 2016).

The third demonstration uses a toy grid of cortical nodes. Perturbing one node in a chosen state, such as wakefulness, deep sleep or anaesthesia, shows a response that either spreads in a differentiated pattern or stays local or uniform, with a toy complexity score. It illustrates the logic of the index and is not the published algorithm.

Demo 3: perturb the cortex and measure the complexity of the echo

Toy complexity score: 0.98. The pulse spreads widely and each region answers differently: integrated and differentiated.

A toy illustration of the idea behind perturbation-based indices: stimulate, record the spread, and score how widespread and varied the response is. It is not the published algorithm, and its scores are not clinical values.

Worked Example

The following comparison is illustrative. The patients and every number are invented for this article, and the arithmetic is the article's own; none of it comes from a study. It rests on the idea that a single brain-based score can separate conscious from unconscious states (Casali et al., 2013).

Four hypothetical patients are rated on two scales from 0 to 1: behavioural responsiveness at the bedside, and a brain-based complexity score. Patient A scores 0.9 for responsiveness and 0.6 for complexity. Patient B scores 0.1 for responsiveness and 0.5 for complexity. Patient C scores 0.1 and 0.2. Patient D scores 0.6 and 0.4.

Suppose an illustrative threshold of 0.3 on the complexity score. Patients A, B and D lie above it and patient C lies below it. A and D would be judged conscious on either measure. C would be judged unconscious on both. Patient B is the informative case: with a responsiveness score of 0.1, B looks unresponsive at the bedside, yet a complexity score of 0.5 exceeds the threshold by 0.2 and would flag B as possibly conscious. That profile matches covert awareness, and it shows why behaviour alone can miss consciousness. Table 1 sets out the four profiles.

Table 1

Behaviour and an Illustrative Brain-Based Score for Four Hypothetical Patients

PatientBehavioural responsivenessBrain-based complexity scoreAbove the 0.3 threshold?Reading
A0.90.6YesResponsive and above threshold: conscious
B0.10.5YesUnresponsive but above threshold: possible covert awareness
C0.10.2NoUnresponsive and below threshold: likely unconscious
D0.60.4YesPartly responsive and above threshold

Note. This article's own invented values on a 0 to 1 scale and an illustrative threshold, not data or a clinical cut-off. Patient B shows why behaviour alone can miss awareness.

Discussion

Some conclusions are now secure. The level of consciousness and its contents are distinct, and they can come apart after brain injury. Brain activity reflecting awareness can be found in some patients who appear unresponsive: in one imaging study, 5 of 54 patients willfully modulated their brain activity, two of them with no voluntary behaviour detectable at the bedside, and one used it to answer questions (Monti et al., 2010). Brain-based indices can track the level of consciousness without relying on behaviour: a hypothesis-generating study introduced one such index (Casali et al., 2013), and a later study validated a cut-off for it in a benchmark population of 150 people (Casarotto et al., 2016).

The larger questions remain open. No theory has prevailed: the first preregistered adversarial test gave partial support to each of the two theories it tested (Cogitate Consortium, 2025), and it is unclear how the main families of theory relate or whether experiments can distinguish them (Seth & Bayne, 2022). Where the correlates lie is unresolved; a paired exchange debated whether the front or the back of the cortex matters (Boly et al., 2017), with the prefrontal side attributing null findings to insensitive methods (Odegaard et al., 2017). Underneath both disputes lies a methodological one, how to separate consciousness from the report and attention that usually accompany it, and both report-based and no-report designs have drawbacks (Tsuchiya et al., 2015). Settling these questions would require experiments in which the theories commit to opposing predictions in advance and in which experience is measured without depending on report.

Current Directions

The field has turned to examining its own methods. Adversarial collaboration, in which rival theorists preregister opposing predictions, produced its first large result in a multimodal study of 256 participants (Cogitate Consortium, 2025). Databases of experiments now let researchers ask how far a study's conclusions follow from its methods; across 412 experiments, methods alone predicted which theory a study supported (Yaron et al., 2022). Proposals for hard empirical criteria aim to thin the crowd of theories (Doerig et al., 2021).

Theory review has become comparative. One review sorted the field into four families of theory (Seth & Bayne, 2022); proponents have restated global neuronal workspace theory in terms of network ignition (Mashour et al., 2020) and argued that higher-order theory demands less than critics suppose (Brown et al., 2019); and integrated information theory has been extended to specify a physical substrate of consciousness (Tononi et al., 2016).

Work on the correlates has included a review placing them mainly in posterior cortex (Koch et al., 2016), a review distinguishing the correlates of particular contents from the capacity for consciousness (Storm et al., 2017), and the use of dreaming to study experience during sleep (Siclari et al., 2017). In the clinic, reviews and guidelines now weigh covert consciousness in prognosis (Edlow et al., 2021) and recommend multimodal diagnosis (Kondziella et al., 2020).

Common Misconceptions

A patient who cannot respond must be unaware.
Functional imaging showed command-following in a single patient who met criteria for the vegetative state, and the authors cautioned that a negative scan would not prove a patient unaware (Owen et al., 2006). The belief persists because clinical diagnosis has long rested on behaviour, which is exactly what such patients cannot produce.
Consciousness and attention are the same thing.
A review of psychophysical evidence concluded that top-down attention and consciousness can be dissociated and are distinct brain processes (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). Others treated attention as a precondition of awareness, though not one that guaranteed it, so whether people can be aware of something they do not attend to remains disputed (Cohen et al., 2012). The two usually operate together, which is why they are easily merged.
Science has settled which theory of consciousness is right.
A preregistered adversarial test of two prominent theories found results that aligned with some predictions of each while substantially challenging key tenets of both (Cogitate Consortium, 2025). Confident statements of a single theory in popular writing hide how open the question remains.
Being awake means being conscious of one's surroundings.
The vegetative state shows wakefulness without awareness (Laureys, 2005). Everyday experience ties being awake to being aware, which is why the two are assumed to go together.

Glossary

Access consciousness.
The availability of information for reasoning, report and the control of action, as distinct from how that information feels.
Attentional blink.
A brief lapse in detecting a second target that appears shortly after a first one in a rapid stream of items.
Blindsight.
Residual visual capacity in a part of the visual field that a person with damage to visual cortex reports being unable to see.
Coma.
A state of unresponsiveness after brain injury in which neither wakefulness nor awareness is evident.
Disorders of consciousness.
Conditions after severe brain injury in which consciousness is reduced or absent, including coma, the vegetative state and the minimally conscious state.
Global workspace.
A widely distributed system that, on one family of theories, makes information available to many cognitive processes at once and so renders it conscious.
Ignition.
A widespread surge of activity across a network, which global neuronal workspace theory associates with conscious access.
Integrated information.
Information generated by a system as a whole beyond that generated by its parts, quantified as phi in integrated information theory.
Minimally conscious state.
A disorder of consciousness, defined by behavioural criteria, in which a patient shows limited but definite signs of awareness, distinguishing it from coma and the vegetative state.
Neural correlates of consciousness.
The minimal brain activity that accompanies a particular conscious experience.
No-report paradigm.
An experimental design that infers what a participant experiences without requiring an explicit report.
Perturbational complexity index.
A score of how integrated and differentiated the cortical response to magnetic stimulation is, proposed as a measure of the level of consciousness that does not depend on behaviour.
Phenomenal consciousness.
The felt, subjective quality of an experience, what it is like to have it.
Readiness potential.
A gradual build-up of brain electrical activity that precedes a self-initiated movement.
Recurrent processing.
Signalling that feeds back from later to earlier stages of a processing hierarchy, which recurrent processing theory places at the heart of visual awareness.
Vegetative state.
A disorder of consciousness, now also called unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, in which a patient shows wakefulness without behavioural signs of awareness.
Wakefulness.
Being awake; the level dimension of consciousness, which can be present without awareness.

Key Researchers

Ned Block

(New York University). Philosopher who distinguished phenomenal consciousness from access consciousness. ORCID · Wikipedia · Wikidata · Google Scholar

Stanislas Dehaene

(Collège de France; NeuroSpin). Cognitive neuroscientist who developed the global neuronal workspace account of conscious access. Wikipedia · Wikidata · Faculty page

Christof Koch

(Allen Institute). Neuroscientist who, with Francis Crick, set out a programme for finding the neural correlates of consciousness. ORCID · Wikipedia · Wikidata · Google Scholar

Victor A. F. Lamme

(University of Amsterdam). Cognitive neuroscientist who argues that consciousness should be defined by neural measures such as recurrent processing. Wikipedia (Dutch) · Wikidata

Steven Laureys

(University of Liège). Neurologist who studies coma, the vegetative state and other disorders of consciousness. ORCID · Wikipedia · Wikidata · Google Scholar

Anil K. Seth

(University of Sussex). Cognitive neuroscientist who studies consciousness, selfhood and interoception through predictive processing. ORCID · Wikipedia · Wikidata

Giulio Tononi

(University of Wisconsin–Madison). Neuroscientist and psychiatrist who proposed integrated information theory and studies consciousness in sleep. Wikipedia · Wikidata · Faculty page

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between the level and the contents of consciousness?

The level is how awake and responsive a person is, and the contents are what the person experiences. The two can separate, as in the vegetative state, where patients show wakefulness without awareness (Laureys, 2005).

Are attention and consciousness the same thing?

They are not the same, but how the two relate is disputed. One review of psychophysical evidence concluded that top down attention and consciousness can be dissociated from each other (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007), while another argued that awareness depended on attention even though attention by itself was not enough to produce it (Cohen et al., 2012).

What are the neural correlates of consciousness?

They are the minimal brain activity that accompanies a particular experience. One influential review placed them mainly in a posterior cortical hot zone and linked frontal and parietal activity largely to monitoring and reporting (Koch et al., 2016).

Which theory of consciousness is best supported?

None has prevailed. A preregistered adversarial collaboration with 256 participants found results that aligned with some predictions of global neuronal workspace theory and integrated information theory while substantially challenging key tenets of both (Cogitate Consortium, 2025).

Can a patient in a vegetative state be aware?

Some can. In one imaging study of 54 patients with disorders of consciousness, 5 showed willful modulation of brain activity, although only one used it to answer questions and bedside communication remained impossible (Monti et al., 2010).

How can consciousness be measured without relying on behaviour?

The perturbational complexity index scores how the brain responds to magnetic stimulation, and in a study of 52 subjects it distinguished conscious states from unconscious ones (Casali et al., 2013). A cut-off for the index was later validated in a larger benchmark group of healthy and brain injured people, although its authors did not offer it as a predictor of recovery (Casarotto et al., 2016).

What happens to consciousness during deep sleep?

During non rapid eye movement sleep, the cortical response to magnetic stimulation stops spreading as it does in wakefulness, and the researchers suggested this breakdown may be related to the fading of consciousness (Massimini et al., 2005).

Does the brain start a voluntary act before a person is aware of deciding?

In a study of five subjects, brain activity before a self initiated movement began earlier than the reported time of the intention to move, although that time was judged only from recall (Libet et al., 1983).

References

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