Abstract

Awareness is a type of cognition: taking account of an object or state of affairs, without implying any assessment of it or attention to its qualities. Research asks how processing without awareness can be demonstrated, through masking, damage to visual cortex and inattention. It also compares ways of measuring awareness, from rating scales and wagers to metacognitive indices, and asks whether awareness is graded or all-or-none. The term further covers awareness of a changing situation, of the body and of oneself, and brain damage can remove awareness of one's own deficits. Three interactive demonstrations show above-chance accuracy without reported visibility, how the choice of scale changes what counts as unaware, and how metacognitive efficiency is computed.

Keywords: awareness, perception without awareness, blindsight, metacognition, situation awareness

A stimulus can shape behaviour while the person exposed to it says nothing was there, and the hardest problem in the study of awareness is proving that this has happened. A review of perception without awareness had to separate what the brain registers from what the observer can report, and concluded that stimuli can be perceived even when observers are unaware of them (Merikle et al., 2001).

The question reaches beyond perception. Every behavioural or brain-based index of awareness builds in assumptions that competing theories of consciousness dispute, so a measure has to earn its validity step by step rather than being taken on trust (Seth et al., 2008). The study of awareness is in that sense where theories of consciousness meet their data.

Key Takeaways

  • Awareness, taking account of something, is argued to differ from attention, the selection of information, and from metacognition, judging the quality of one's own performance; one review of psychophysical evidence treats attention and awareness as dissociable yet closely related, while another holds that attention is necessary for awareness.
  • Perception without awareness, the processing of a stimulus the person does not report seeing, is widely reported with visual masking, but a small psychophysical study found no evidence for it once introspection was measured carefully, and unreliable awareness tests weaken many null results.
  • Blindsight, accurate responses to stimuli in a part of the visual field the person says they cannot see, follows damage to primary visual cortex; a review warns that artefacts are often ignored and that its everyday usefulness is unresolved.
  • Measures of awareness disagree: in one masked identification study the Perceptual Awareness Scale, a rating of how clearly a stimulus was experienced, tracked performance best, while post-decision wagering, betting on one's own answer, is swayed by risk aversion.
  • Whether awareness is graded, coming in degrees, or all-or-none, simply present or absent, is unsettled, and so is where in the brain experience arises; the global neuronal workspace, a proposal that conscious contents are broadcast across the brain, remains contested.
  • Situation awareness, keeping track of a changing task, is judged a viable construct whose measurement is still controversial; accuracy in sensing one's own heartbeat has been correlated with right anterior insula activity and is distinct from interoceptive awareness, how well confidence matches that accuracy, and unawareness of paralysis after stroke has widely varying estimates.

What Awareness Is

The act of taking account of an object or state of affairs. It does not imply assessment of, nor attention to the qualities or nature of the object.

Scope note for the MeSH descriptor Awareness (D001364), U.S. National Library of Medicine.

MeSH lists two entry terms under this descriptor, Situation Awareness and Situational Awareness. Both name the applied sense of the word: keeping track of what is happening around one in a changing task, such as flying or driving, which this article takes up in its section on situation awareness.

In laboratory research the word usually means the subjective side of perception: whether a person experiences a stimulus, as opposed to whether the stimulus influences what the person does. Lamme argued in a theoretical paper that visual awareness and visual attention are distinct concepts, and that awareness has more in common with memory than with attention (Lamme, 2003). Awareness also has to be kept apart from metacognition, the monitoring of one's own performance. A person's confidence can track accuracy well, which is metacognitive sensitivity, yet that sensitivity is not the same thing as conscious awareness of the stimulus (Fleming & Lau, 2014).

MeSH files awareness under cognition, as one of the processes by which information is taken up and used. It sits beside consciousness rather than beneath it: consciousness is the broader study of experience and its neural basis, and awareness names the experience of a particular object, state or situation. Much of what follows concerns the methods for telling the two kinds of processing, with and without awareness, apart.

Perception Without Awareness

The core claim of this literature is that stimuli can be perceived without being experienced. A review from cognitive psychology described two broad strategies for showing it (Merikle et al., 2001). One is dissociation: an observer performs above chance on a forced-choice discrimination while giving subjective verbal reports of seeing nothing. The other looks for qualitative differences, cases in which a stimulus has one kind of effect when it is consciously perceived and a different kind when it is not.

Visual masking, in which a brief stimulus is followed or preceded by another that renders it invisible, supplies most of the data. A critical review of masking studies concluded that non-conscious processing is broad and well established, while noting that brain activation is often weaker when a stimulus is subliminal (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). The authors separated two kinds of non-conscious processing, preconscious and subliminal, and argued that strong activation is not enough on its own to bring a stimulus to conscious access; top-down attention is a second factor.

Dehaene and colleagues proposed a taxonomy of processing states: a subliminal state, a conscious state, and between them a preconscious state (Dehaene et al., 2006). The proposal is offered as testable rather than established, and the same paper acknowledged that neuroimaging results on conscious perception appear inconsistent.

A psychophysical study of masked Gabor patches in nine observers, which combined two-interval confidence ratings with a Bayesian ideal-observer analysis, found no evidence of unconscious perception (Peters & Lau, 2015). The study turned on the gap between a subjective threshold, below which observers report no awareness, and an objective threshold, below which their forced choices fall to chance. Its limits matter: the sample was small, it could not rule out subliminal priming, and it tested no observers with brain damage. Measurement error is a second source of doubt. Taking contextual cuing of visual search as their test case, alongside a psychometric meta-analysis and simulations, Vadillo and colleagues showed that low reliability in awareness tests undermines the common inference from a null correlation between awareness and performance to unconscious processing (Vadillo et al., 2022). They called for richer and larger data sets before such claims are made.

Both thresholds are defined against sensory thresholds in the classical sense, and the analysis of hits and false alarms that separates them comes from signal detection theory. The demonstration below lets a reader move stimulus strength and the report criterion and watch where accuracy and reported visibility part company. Its observer is simulated, and the curves are illustrative rather than data.

Demo 1: above chance, but reported unseen

chance (50%)forced-choice accuracyreported seenstimulus strength
Accuracy 91%, reported seen on 63% of trials. Move the strength into the shaded band to see accuracy rise while reports stay low.

Illustrative model, not data. Both curves come from one internal signal: accuracy reflects the signal itself, while a report of seeing needs the signal to cross a separate criterion. A stricter criterion widens the band, which is why a gap between the two measures can reflect where the observer sets the bar rather than perception without awareness.

Figure 1 illustrates the same logic in schematic form.

Figure 1

The Objective and Subjective Thresholds and the Band Between Them

Forced-choice accuracy and reported visibility as stimulus strength increases Two S-shaped curves over a horizontal axis of stimulus strength. A navy curve for forced-choice accuracy starts at chance and rises early. A red curve for the proportion of trials reported as seen starts near zero and rises later. A shaded band between a marker labelled objective threshold and a marker labelled subjective threshold covers strengths where accuracy is above chance but reports of seeing remain rare. chance objective threshold subjective threshold above chance, reported unseen forced-choice accuracy reported seen stimulus strength
Note. An original schematic, not data. The objective threshold marks where forced-choice performance first rises above chance; the subjective threshold marks where people begin to report seeing. Stimuli in the shaded band are used without being reported, the classic pattern behind claims of perception without awareness. Where the subjective threshold falls depends partly on how strict the report criterion is.

Blindsight

Neurological patients provide a second line of evidence. In 1974 Weiskrantz and colleagues reported residual visual capacity in the half of the visual field left blind by a restricted lesion of occipital cortex (Weiskrantz et al., 1974). The phenomenon, later called blindsight, has since been studied for decades.

A narrative review of that history concluded that unseen stimuli are indeed processed after damage to primary visual cortex, but it was blunt about the weaknesses of the literature (Cowey, 2010). In a study of a single patient, discrimination which looked unconscious under a binary seen or unseen report in fact tracked faint, degraded conscious experience once the patient rated each stimulus on the Perceptual Awareness Scale, which suggests that some blindsight reflects degraded rather than absent awareness (Overgaard et al., 2008). The evidence comes from one patient, although its authors argued that it calls for a reconsideration of blindsight and of many studies of unconscious perception in healthy observers (Overgaard et al., 2008). Cowey's review also warned that artefacts are often ignored, that the genuine qualities of residual vision remain uncertain, and that whether blindsight is of any use in daily life is unresolved (Cowey, 2010). A later review argued that the pathways behind blindsight and related forms of unconscious vision likely contribute to normal visual perception as well, but can be studied only when damage to primary visual cortex removes the major input (Ajina & Bridge, 2017).

Attention and Awareness

It is tempting to equate awareness with whatever is attended. Lamme's theoretical case was that the two are different processes, with awareness overlapping memory more than it overlaps attention (Lamme, 2003). Koch and Tsuchiya reviewed psychophysical evidence, including stimuli rendered perceptually invisible and perception of a scene's gist, and argued that top-down attention and consciousness can be dissociated (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). An opposing position holds that attention is necessary for awareness but not sufficient for it, and it reads apparent cases of awareness without attention in another way (Cohen et al., 2012). Those authors proposed a battery of attention paradigms for testing such cases (Cohen et al., 2012). Koch and Tsuchiya's case rested on psychophysical evidence, and they noted that the close relationship between the two processes has led many to conflate them (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007).

The reverse case, attention without awareness of what lies outside its focus, is shown by inattentional blindness. In experiments with dynamic displays, observers engaged in a monitoring task often failed to notice an unexpected object; whether they noticed it depended on how difficult the task was and on how similar the object was to the items being tracked, while its spatial proximity to the attended items had no apparent effect (Simons & Chabris, 1999). The findings tie awareness of an event to how divided attention is allocated. The attentional blink offers another route to the same question and is taken up in the section on whether awareness is graded.

Measuring Awareness

Every claim in the preceding sections depends on how awareness was assessed. Most measures in visual psychophysics pair a first-order judgment about the stimulus with some second report about the observer's experience of it, and the choice of that second report is itself contested. The place of introspection in claims of subliminal perception is the subject of a paper by Ramsøy and Overgaard (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004).

Direct comparisons show that the choice matters. In a masked visual identification experiment, post-decision wagering, confidence ratings and the Perceptual Awareness Scale were applied to the same task, and the Perceptual Awareness Scale tracked performance best (Sandberg et al., 2010). Performance was above chance on trials reported as unaware with every scale, but such unconscious effects appeared only alongside some conscious knowledge.

Post-decision wagering, in which observers bet on the correctness of their own response, was put forward as an objective measure of awareness on the grounds that subjective measures are uncertain; it was tested with an artificial grammar task, the Iowa gambling task and in blindsight (Persaud et al., 2007). A later set of artificial grammar learning experiments compared three methods, verbal confidence ratings, a no-loss gamble and wagering, and found wagering no better than confidence at indexing awareness of knowing; it was also affected by risk aversion (Dienes & Seth, 2010). The broader lesson is that measures presuppose positions in a theoretical dispute, so that validating them and testing theories go together (Seth et al., 2008).

Metacognitive measures offer a way out of some of these problems. A methodological review recommended bias-free measures of metacognitive sensitivity, such as meta-d' and the area under the type 2 ROC curve, over older indices such as Goodman–Kruskal gamma and the phi correlation, and introduced metacognitive efficiency as meta-d' relative to d' (Fleming & Lau, 2014). It also warned that one-shot ratings confound bias with sensitivity and that metacognitive sensitivity does not equal awareness. The measure meta-d' was developed within signal detection theory to estimate type 2 sensitivity from confidence ratings independently of response bias; in a two-interval forced-choice visual task, metacognition came near to, but fell below, the optimal level (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012).

The second demonstration rates the same simulated trials on an awareness scale, a confidence scale and a wager, and shows how the share of trials called unaware, and accuracy on them, shifts with the scale and with a risk-aversion setting for wagers.

Demo 2: the scale changes how much looks unconscious

Lowest ratingTrials rated unawareAccuracy on those trials
Perceptual Awareness Scale (lowest step)30%62%
The more trials a scale sweeps into its lowest category, the higher accuracy on supposedly unaware trials becomes, and the stronger the apparent evidence for perception without awareness.

Illustrative model, not data. The trials are identical across scales; only where each scale draws its lowest category differs. The cut-points are invented: a finer awareness scale is given the lowest cut, and wagers drift upward with risk aversion because a cautious bettor bets low even when fairly sure.

The third demonstration computes d', an approximate meta-d' and their ratio from hit rates, false-alarm rates and the separation of confidence between correct and incorrect trials, with the Worked Example's values as its default.

Demo 3: how much of what you know does confidence know?

QuantityValue
z(hit) − z(false alarm) = d′0.99 − (-0.99) = 1.99
meta-d′1.40
Efficiency (meta-d′ / d′)0.70
Confidence carries about 70% of the information available in the decision.

Illustrative calculator. d′ uses the standard inverse-normal transform; meta-d′ is set directly here, whereas in practice it is estimated by fitting a signal-detection model to confidence ratings. The defaults reproduce the worked example: d′ ≈ 2.0, meta-d′ = 1.4, efficiency ≈ 0.70.

Graded or All-or-None?

A long-standing dispute concerns whether awareness comes in degrees. Using a continuous visibility scale during the attentional blink, Sergent and Dehaene found that reported visibility of target words was all-or-none rather than gradual (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004). They read this as a bifurcation between seen and unseen states, an interpretation the study suggested but did not prove.

Overgaard and colleagues compared report methods in a visual task and found support for graded conscious perception, arguing that it comes in different levels rather than switching between two states (Overgaard et al., 2006). The published abstract gives no sample details. The two results are not strictly contradictory, since they come from different tasks and report methods, which returns the question to measurement.

Neural Correlates

One prominent neural proposal is the global neuronal workspace. On this view, conscious perception coincides with sudden surges of activity in parieto-frontal networks and top-down amplification of the represented content (Dehaene et al., 2006); a later restatement describes this ignition as broadcasting a representation across the brain, and relates it to attention and working memory (Mashour et al., 2020). Its standing is contested. A recent review compared it with other families of theories of consciousness, starting from the observation that it is unclear how such theories relate to one another or whether they can be told apart empirically, and considered how empirical debates might distinguish them (Seth & Bayne, 2022). A preregistered adversarial collaboration set the global neuronal workspace against integrated information theory in 256 participants, combining fMRI, magnetoencephalography and intracranial recordings (Cogitate Consortium et al., 2025). Neither theory came through intact: each had some predictions supported and others challenged, with no general ignition when the stimulus ended and limited prefrontal representation of some conscious dimensions counting against the workspace view and no sustained synchronization in posterior cortex counting against integrated information theory, whose standing is therefore contested (Cogitate Consortium et al., 2025). Looking across 412 experiments drawn from 365 papers and coded in a theory-neutral database, one analysis was able to tell which theory of consciousness an experiment would end up favouring from the way it was designed, without looking at its results (Yaron et al., 2022). The authors note limits of their own: they accepted each paper's reported outcome as given and did not re-run its statistics, and higher-order theories were sparsely represented in the database (Yaron et al., 2022). Another review placed the neural correlates of consciousness in a posterior cortical hot zone and assigned fronto-parietal networks a role in task monitoring and reporting rather than in experience itself, while cautioning that some candidate markers had proved illusory (Koch et al., 2016). Higher-order theories take a different route and tie awareness to higher-order representations of a person's own mental states. Lau and Rosenthal (2011) argued that this family of theories, which began in philosophy, has substantial empirical support over first-order rivals, including a role for prefrontal cortex, and they defended that role against its critics rather than conceding the point. The standing of higher-order theories is contested: a later review counted them among several families of theories whose relations to one another, and whose empirical distinguishability, remain unclear (Seth & Bayne, 2022).

Lamme argued for a different starting point: neural measures should count as equal to behavioural ones in deciding what is conscious, which, he acknowledged, means giving up some intuitive notions of experience; his case drew on visual neuroscience (Lamme, 2006). Lamme's own account is recurrent processing theory, which goes back to an earlier review with Roelfsema (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). That review held that the first feedforward sweep of activity through visual cortex is probably not enough for visual awareness, and that in many cases awareness needs recurrent processing carried by horizontal and feedback connections (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). The theory's standing is contested: a later comparative review placed re-entry theories among four families of theory, and it judged both how those families relate to one another and whether experiments can tell them apart to be unclear (Seth & Bayne, 2022). A related review called for separating the mechanisms of experience from the functions that merely enable it or report on it, distinguished full from content-specific neural correlates, and argued that the role of frontal cortex needs reconsidering (Storm et al., 2017). Whether frontal regions such as the prefrontal cortex are required for awareness itself, or only for acting on it, is therefore open.

Situation Awareness

In applied settings the term has a different emphasis. Situation awareness, also called situational awareness, refers to an operator's grasp of what is happening in a dynamic environment. Endsley's theory of situation awareness placed it within dynamic decision making and set out the factors that bear on it, among them workload, automation, stress, attention, mental models, system complexity, working memory and goals (Endsley, 1995a). The paper was theoretical and reported no data; the mechanisms it described for overcoming these limits were hypothesized.

The theory's standing is contested on measurement. A review of Endsley's two 1995 articles judged situation awareness a viable and important construct but found its measurement still controversial (Wickens, 2008). For measurement, Endsley (1995b) described a query technique in which a simulation is frozen and operators answer questions about the current situation. Across two studies she reported that the queries were not intrusive and were not compromised by the limits of operators' memory, although the abstract does not report the sample sizes (Endsley, 1995b). Among the critical treatments is a paper by Dekker and Hollnagel (2004) that casts human-factors constructs as folk models. Endsley later answered critics, arguing that many critiques rest on misunderstandings of the theory, and discussed sensemaking and the distributed and situated forms of situation awareness in relation to it (Endsley, 2015). That reply is a defence by the theory's author, and the measurement question it addresses remains debated.

Awareness of the Body and the Self

Awareness is also directed inward, at the state of the body and at the self, topics that border on interoception and body image. In an fMRI study using a heartbeat timing judgment task, activity in the right anterior insula predicted how accurately people detected their own heartbeats, a correlational result (Critchley et al., 2004). Garfinkel et al. (2015) later separated three dimensions in 80 participants: interoceptive accuracy on heartbeat detection tests, interoceptive sensibility as people report it themselves, and interoceptive awareness, defined as how closely confidence matches accuracy. The three dimensions proved dissociable and lined up only among the most accurate participants, so, in these terms, the 2004 insula result concerns interoceptive accuracy, since the activity predicted accuracy in heartbeat detection (Critchley et al., 2004), rather than interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015). The 2004 study also related interoceptive accuracy to negative emotional experience and subjective feeling states, linking awareness of the body to research on emotions (Critchley et al., 2004).

Craig proposed that the anterior insula supports awareness more broadly and is a candidate neural correlate of consciousness, with von Economo neurons among the features he discussed (Craig, 2009). He framed the proposal tentatively, as something new findings suggest rather than show.

Self-awareness raises its own conceptual problems. A separate social-psychology tradition of research on self-awareness, which this article does not cover in detail, includes Duval and Wicklund's 1972 monograph setting out a theory of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). A theoretical review compared nine neurocognitive models of levels of consciousness and self-awareness, set out where they converge and diverge, and noted that some theorists build models without reference to existing ones (Morin, 2006).

Brain damage can remove awareness of a deficit itself. A systematic review of English and French papers published between January 1990 and January 2007 described anosognosia for hemiplegia after stroke as multifaceted, with its causes still debated (Orfei et al., 2007). Epidemiological estimates varied widely, from 7 to 77%, and the authors found that existing questionnaires often lack discriminative power and called for multidimensional assessment.

Worked Example

The calculation below is this article's own illustrative arithmetic, not a result from any study. It rests on one definition: metacognitive efficiency is meta-d' relative to d', so that a ratio of 1 is the benchmark and 0.7 corresponds to 70% efficiency (Fleming & Lau, 2014).

Suppose an observer in a detection task has a hit rate of .84 and a false-alarm rate of .16. Type 1 sensitivity is d' = z(.84) − z(.16) = 0.99 − (−0.99), about 2.0. If the observer's confidence ratings carry the information of meta-d' = 1.4, metacognitive efficiency is 1.4 / 2.0 = 0.70. An observer at the objective threshold has d' = 0, so performance is at chance whatever the observer reports.

The three quantities answer different questions. A d' above zero shows that the stimulus was processed; meta-d' and efficiency show how well confidence tracks that processing; neither, on its own, shows that the observer was aware. Claims about awareness therefore rest on which of these quantities a study measured. Table 1 sets them side by side.

Table 1

Type 1 Sensitivity and Metacognitive Efficiency for Four Illustrative Observers

Hit rateFalse-alarm rated′meta-d′ (illustrative)Efficiency (meta-d′ / d′)
0.840.161.991.40.70
0.690.310.990.50.50
0.930.072.953.01.02
0.500.500.000.0undefined

Note. This article's own illustrative calculation, not data. d′ = z(hit rate) − z(false-alarm rate), using the inverse of the standard normal distribution; the meta-d′ values are chosen for illustration, not estimated. The first row is the worked example. In the last row the observer is at the objective threshold (d′ = 0), so there is no performance for confidence to track and efficiency is undefined.

Discussion

Some conclusions are widely accepted. Masked stimuli are processed without being consciously reported, across a wide range of tasks, even if activation is usually weaker when they are subliminal (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Patients with damage to primary visual cortex process stimuli they say they cannot see, although artefacts and the true quality of that residual vision remain concerns (Cowey, 2010). Attention can operate on stimuli that are not consciously seen, at least in psychophysical data, although whether awareness can occur without attention is disputed (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Cohen et al., 2012).

Other questions are open. Whether unconscious perception survives careful measurement of introspection is disputed, since one small study found no evidence for it (Peters & Lau, 2015), and many claims of unconscious processing rest on null correlations that unreliable awareness tests cannot support (Vadillo et al., 2022). Whether awareness is graded is unsettled, and the answer may depend on how it is reported. It remains unclear how the leading theories relate to one another and whether experiments can tell them apart (Seth & Bayne, 2022). In applied work, how to measure situation awareness is still argued over. Running through all of these is a single problem: the evidence for any claim about awareness is only as good as the measure of awareness behind it, and designs that test reliability and compare measures within the same observers could help settle these disputes.

Current Directions

Recent work has turned the field's attention to its own measurement. Vadillo and colleagues argued that, because awareness tests are often unreliable, a null correlation between awareness and performance usually cannot establish that a process is unconscious (Vadillo et al., 2022). A multi-author statement addressed the opportunities and challenges facing a maturing science of consciousness (Michel et al., 2019). On the theoretical side, the workspace proposal has been restated in terms of ignition and global broadcast (Mashour et al., 2020), and a comparative review has asked how the main families of theories relate and how they might be tested against one another (Seth & Bayne, 2022). The contributions of posterior and frontal cortex are being re-examined, with posterior regions proposed as the seat of experience (Koch et al., 2016) and the role of frontal cortex reconsidered (Storm et al., 2017). Blindsight continues to be used to map the pathways of intact vision (Ajina & Bridge, 2017).

Common Misconceptions

Whatever a person attends to is exactly what that person is aware of.
Psychophysical evidence indicates that top-down attention and consciousness can be dissociated, although the two are closely related in everyday perception (Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). The belief persists because attended items are usually the ones a person can report.
People with blindsight secretly see, and simply describe it badly.
The literature supports processing of unseen stimuli after damage to primary visual cortex, while warning that artefacts are often ignored and that the genuine qualities of residual vision remain uncertain (Cowey, 2010). The question is open, not settled in favour of hidden sight. One single-patient study does suggest that some blindsight may involve faint, degraded conscious vision that a simple seen or unseen report fails to capture, though one case cannot settle how common this is (Overgaard et al., 2008).
Confidence ratings are a direct readout of awareness.
How well confidence tracks accuracy, metacognitive sensitivity, should not be equated directly with awareness of the stimulus, and a single rating cannot separate a person's general tendency to feel confident from that sensitivity; the same review favours reading the level of confidence as reflecting awareness, but only once task performance is controlled for (Fleming & Lau, 2014).
Unconscious perception has been firmly demonstrated.
A psychophysical study that measured observers' introspection carefully found no evidence of unconscious perception, though its sample was small and it could not rule out subliminal priming (Peters & Lau, 2015). The belief rests on dissociation findings whose awareness measures are open to challenge.

Glossary

Anosognosia.
Unawareness of one's own illness or deficit, as when a person paralysed on one side after a stroke does not acknowledge the paralysis; estimates of how often it occurs vary widely.
Awareness.
Taking account of an object or state of affairs, without implying any evaluation of it or attention to its qualities.
Blindsight.
Above-chance responses to stimuli in a region of the visual field that a person with damage to primary visual cortex reports as blind; how far it reflects genuine residual vision is still debated.
Global neuronal workspace.
A contested proposal that a content becomes conscious when activity in widespread brain networks ignites and broadcasts it for use by many processes.
Inattentional blindness.
Failure to notice an unexpected object or event while attention is engaged elsewhere.
Interoceptive awareness.
How closely a person's confidence in sensing internal bodily signals, such as the heartbeat, matches their measured accuracy; distinct from interoceptive accuracy itself and from self-reported interoceptive sensibility.
Metacognitive sensitivity.
How well a person's confidence distinguishes correct from incorrect responses; it is not the same as awareness of the stimulus.
Neural correlates of consciousness.
Brain activity that accompanies a conscious experience, studied in the hope of identifying the minimal processes sufficient for it.
Objective threshold.
The stimulus level below which forced-choice performance falls to chance.
Perceptual Awareness Scale.
A rating scale on which observers report how clearly they experienced a stimulus, used as a subjective measure of visual awareness.
Post-decision wagering.
A measure in which a person bets on whether a just-made response was correct; it is affected by attitudes to risk.
Situation awareness.
An operator's grasp of what is happening in a changing task environment and what it means for action; its measurement is still debated.
Situational awareness.
A synonym for situation awareness, listed by MeSH as an entry term under Awareness.
Subjective threshold.
The stimulus level below which observers report no awareness of a stimulus, whatever their forced-choice accuracy.
Subliminal perception.
Processing of a stimulus presented too weakly or briefly to be consciously reported, typically studied with masking; how robust it is remains disputed.

Key Researchers

A. D. Craig

(Barrow Neurological Institute; 1951–2023). Neuroanatomist who traced the pathways carrying signals about the body's internal state and proposed that the anterior insula supports awareness of that state. Wikipedia · Wikidata

Stanislas Dehaene

(Collège de France; NeuroSpin (INSERM-CEA Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit)). Cognitive neuroscientist who, with colleagues, developed the global neuronal workspace account of how information becomes consciously accessible. Wikipedia · Wikidata · Faculty page

Mica R. Endsley

(SA Technologies). Human factors engineer whose model of situation awareness divides it into perceiving, comprehending and projecting the state of a dynamic environment. ORCID · Wikipedia · Wikidata

Victor A. F. Lamme

(University of Amsterdam). Cognitive neuroscientist who has argued that visual attention and awareness are different processes and that neural measures should help define consciousness. Faculty page

Hakwan Lau

(Institute for Basic Science Center for Neuroscience Imaging Research; Sungkyunkwan University). Cognitive neuroscientist who studies awareness and metacognition, including signal-detection methods for measuring how well confidence tracks accuracy. Faculty page

Morten Overgaard

(Aarhus University (Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience)). Cognitive neuroscientist whose work on introspective report produced the Perceptual Awareness Scale and evidence that visual awareness can be graded. ORCID · Faculty page

Anil K. Seth

(University of Sussex). Cognitive and computational neuroscientist who has compared behavioural and neural measures of consciousness and reviewed the field's main theories. Wikipedia · Wikidata · Faculty page

Lawrence Weiskrantz

(University of Oxford; 1926–2018). Neuropsychologist who documented blindsight, the ability to respond to visual stimuli in a field the patient reports as blind. Wikipedia · Wikidata · Faculty page

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between awareness and attention?

Attention selects information for further processing, whereas awareness concerns whether that information is experienced. A theoretical paper argued that the two are distinct and that awareness overlaps memory more than attention (Lamme, 2003).

Can a person perceive something without being aware of it?

A critical review of visual masking concluded that stimuli can be processed without conscious report, across many tasks, although brain activation is often weaker for such stimuli (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007).

Is the evidence for unconscious perception secure?

Not entirely. Many claims rest on finding no correlation between awareness and performance, and low reliability in awareness tests makes such null results unsafe as evidence (Vadillo et al., 2022).

What is blindsight?

Blindsight is the processing of stimuli in a part of the visual field that a person with damage to primary visual cortex reports as blind. A review of its history noted that artefacts are often ignored and that its usefulness in daily life is unresolved (Cowey, 2010).

How do researchers measure awareness?

They use subjective reports such as rating scales and confidence, as well as wagers. In one masked identification experiment the Perceptual Awareness Scale tracked performance better than confidence ratings or wagering (Sandberg et al., 2010).

Is awareness all or nothing?

The evidence is mixed. A comparison of report methods in a visual task supported different levels of conscious perception rather than a simple present-or-absent switch (Overgaard et al., 2006).

What is situation awareness?

Situation awareness, also called situational awareness, is an operator's grasp of a changing environment during dynamic decisions. A review judged it a viable and important construct whose measurement remains controversial (Wickens, 2008).

Which brain region is linked to awareness of the body?

In an imaging study using a heartbeat timing task, activity in the right anterior insula predicted how accurately people detected their own heartbeats, although the evidence is correlational (Critchley et al., 2004).

References

Ajina, S., & Bridge, H. (2017). Blindsight and unconscious vision: What they teach us about the human visual system. The Neuroscientist, 23(5), 529–541. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073858416673817

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