Abstract

Lacanian theory, which the Medical Subject Headings thesaurus files beneath psychoanalytic theory, is the reinterpretation of Freud developed by the French analyst Jacques Lacan. Its founding thesis is that the unconscious is structured like a language: the subject is constituted by its entry into a symbolic order of signifiers that precedes and exceeds it. Lacan mapped mental life across three registers, the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real; traced the ego to a formative mirror stage of misrecognition; and located desire in a lost object he called the objet petit a. His late theory of four discourses formalised the social bond. The framework is clinically generative and influential across the humanities, yet its resistance to operational measurement keeps it at the margin of empirical psychology, where recent work probes its convergence with research on psychosis.

Keywords: Lacanian theory, Symbolic order, mirror stage, objet petit a, the Real

Jacques Lacan was the most influential and the most difficult of Freud's successors. Under the banner of a return to Freud, he argued that psychoanalysis had been domesticated by the ego psychology of the post-war years and set out to recover its radical core by reading Freud through structural linguistics and then through topology (Lacan, 2001; Homer, 2005). Where Freudian theory grounded mental life in instinctual drive, Lacan relocated its engine in language and in the relation to the other, holding that the subject is not the master of a private inner world but an effect of the signifiers that speak through it. The Medical Subject Headings file the result beneath psychoanalytic theory, the broad family of depth-psychological ideas Freud founded and others revised. Cognitive psychology has engaged Lacanian theory only selectively, since much of it is framed in terms that resist measurement, but its account of psychosis and of the subject of language has drawn renewed attention (Vanheule, 2016; Parker, 2017).

Key Takeaways
  • Lacanian theory rereads Freud through linguistics: the unconscious is structured like a language, and the subject is constituted by its entry into a symbolic order of signifiers.
  • Mental life is mapped across three registers, the Imaginary (image and ego), the Symbolic (language and law), and the Real (what resists symbolisation), held together like a Borromean knot.
  • The ego is formed in the mirror stage through identification with an external image, so that self-recognition is from the outset a misrecognition.
  • Desire arises from a constitutive lack and circles a lost object, the objet petit a, which is its cause rather than its goal; the four discourses formalise how the social bond is organised.
  • The framework is clinically productive, especially for psychosis, and pervasive in the humanities, but its core concepts resist operational measurement, leaving it marginal to empirical psychology.

What Lacanian Theory Is

Lacanian theory is the system of concepts Jacques Lacan developed across his annual Paris seminar between 1953 and 1980 to reformulate psychoanalysis as a theory of the subject of language (Lacan, 2001; Fink, 1995). It shares with Freudian theory the founding conviction that the unconscious governs much of mental life and that it speaks through dreams, slips, and symptoms. What distinguishes the Lacanian core is the claim about what kind of thing the unconscious is: not a reservoir of biological drive but a structure organised like a language, whose elements are signifiers and whose laws are those of metaphor and metonymy (Evans, 1996).

From this single move the rest of the theory follows. If the unconscious is linguistic, then the subject who is its bearer is also an effect of language, divided by the very signifiers that give it a place to speak; the ego, by contrast, belongs to a different register, the register of the image, and is a source of illusion rather than of truth (Fink, 1995). The sections below take the theory roughly in the order Lacan built it: the return to Freud and the primacy of the signifier, the mirror stage and the formation of the ego, the three registers that organise experience, the divided subject and its relation to the Other, the object and structure of desire, the four discourses that formalise the social bond, the diagnostic structures of the clinic, and finally the vexed question of what empirical psychology can make of any of it.

The Return to Freud and the Signifier

Lacan's slogan, that the unconscious is structured like a language, is a claim about mechanism, and it rests on an appropriation of Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistics (Lacan, 2001). Saussure had defined the linguistic sign as the union of a signifier (the sound-image) and a signified (the concept), written as a fraction with the signified above the bar and the signifier below. Lacan inverted and rewrote the relation, placing the signifier above the bar and treating the bar itself as a resistance to signification: meaning is not fixed to each signifier but is produced only in the movement from one signifier to the next (Fink, 1995; Evans, 1996). Figure 1 contrasts the two formulations.

Figure 1

Saussure's sign and Lacan's rewriting of it Two diagrams side by side. On the left, Saussure's sign: the concept-word signified sits above a horizontal bar and the sound-image signifier sits below it, enclosed in an ellipse with arrows showing a stable mutual relation. On the right, Lacan's algorithm: a capital S for the signifier sits above the bar and a small italic s for the signified sits below it, with the bar marked as a barrier the signifier does not cross, and a horizontal arrow showing meaning sliding along a chain of signifiers rather than anchoring to one signified. Saussure signified (concept) signifier (sound-image) signified over signifier; the sign is a stable unit Lacan S (signifier) s (signified) signifier over signified; meaning slides along the chain
Saussure bound a signifier to a signified in a stable sign. Lacan raised the signifier above a resistant bar and let meaning slide along the chain of signifiers, so that no signifier delivers a fixed concept and the subject is caught in the movement of language itself.

The consequence is that the speaking subject does not command meaning but is subjected to it. A signifier, in Lacan's much-quoted formula, is what represents the subject for another signifier; the subject appears only in the gaps of the chain, in the slip and the symptom, and is in that precise sense an effect of language rather than its author (Lacan, 2001; Homer, 2005).

The Mirror Stage

The earliest of Lacan's enduring contributions is the mirror stage, first presented in the 1930s and refined in the essay that opens the Écrits (Lacan, 2001). Between roughly six and eighteen months, Lacan observed, the human infant, still motorically uncoordinated and experiencing its body as fragmented, recognises itself in a mirror and greets the image with jubilation. The image offers a gestalt, a unified and bounded form, that anticipates a mastery the infant does not yet possess. Identification with this external image founds the ego, and does so on a contradiction: the self is first grasped as something outside, whole where the body is fragmented, so that self-recognition is structurally a misrecognition (Fink, 1995; Evans, 1996).

This has two lasting implications for the theory. First, the ego is an object in the Imaginary register, an alienating identification rather than the seat of agency, which is why Lacan treats the ego psychologist's project of strengthening the ego as a deepening of the patient's alienation. Second, the structure installs a permanent dependence on the image of the other, a rivalry and captation that colours all later relationships. Contemporary analysts have continued to rework the mirror stage, treating it less as a datable event than as a general operation by which identity is assembled from an external image, and relating it to questions of identity and recognition in the clinic (Heimann, 2022; Bailly, 2023). The model below steps through the formation of the ego from the fragmented body to the specular image.

The Three Orders

The mature framework organises all of experience across three registers or orders: the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real (Evans, 1996; Fink, 1995). The Imaginary is the order of the image and the ego, of resemblance, identification, and the dual relation founded in the mirror stage; it is the register of wholeness and of illusion. The Symbolic is the order of language, law, and difference, the field of the signifier and of the social pact, into which the child is inserted and which Lacan held to be the determining register for the human subject. The Real is the hardest to state because it is defined negatively: it is what resists symbolisation absolutely, what falls outside language and returns always to the same place, manifest in trauma, in the impasse of the clinic, and in bodily jouissance (Lacan, 1978).

Lacan insisted that the three are not a developmental sequence but are co-present and mutually dependent, and in his late teaching he figured their interdependence with the Borromean knot, three rings linked so that cutting any one frees the other two (Evans, 1996). The topology was not decoration: it expressed the claim that subjectivity holds together only through the knotting of the three orders, and that clinical structures can be understood as different ways the knot is tied or fails. Žižek's influential cultural criticism took the Real as its pivot, reading ideology and enjoyment through the register that escapes the Symbolic (Žižek, 1989). The model below lets each ring of the knot be isolated to show what belongs to each register.

The Subject and the Other

If the subject is an effect of the signifier, then it is from the start dependent on the field in which signifiers reside, which Lacan calls the Other with a capital O, the treasury of language and the locus of the law, distinct from the small other who is a fellow being in the Imaginary (Fink, 1995; Evans, 1996). To speak at all the subject must pass through the Other, must receive its message, Lacan said, in inverted form from the Other, and must take on a desire that is articulated in the Other's terms: the celebrated thesis that desire is the desire of the Other captures both that we desire what the other desires and that we desire to be the object of the other's desire.

The subject that emerges from this dependence is a divided or barred subject, written with a struck-through S, split between the conscious ego and the unconscious discourse that speaks through it (Fink, 1995). Entry into the Symbolic exacts a loss, the renunciation that Lacan, following Freud's Oedipal account, ties to the Name-of-the-Father, the signifier that installs the law and prohibition; and it is the fate of this signifier that distinguishes the clinical structures discussed below (Fink, 1997). The barred subject is thus not a deficiency to be repaired but the very form of subjectivity in language.

Objet Petit a and Desire

Entry into language leaves a remainder. Something of the pre-symbolic satisfaction is lost when the subject submits to the signifier, and that lost object, which never in fact existed as such, is what Lacan names the objet petit a, the object-cause of desire (Lacan, 1978; Kirshner, 2005). The crucial and easily missed point is that the objet a is not the object the subject desires but the cause that sets desire in motion: it is the void around which desire circulates, approached through part-objects such as the gaze and the voice but never attained, so that desire is by its nature metonymic, sliding from object to object without ever coming to rest.

This distinguishes desire sharply from need and from demand. Need has an object that satisfies it; demand is addressed to the Other and asks, beneath whatever it requests, for love; desire is what remains when demand is subtracted from need, an irreducible want-of-being that no object fills (Fink, 1995; Evans, 1996). The clinical consequence is that symptoms are read not as failures to obtain a satisfying object but as particular arrangements of the subject's relation to the objet a and to jouissance, a reading that recent Lacanian work on psychosis has developed in detail (De Battista, 2017).

The Four Discourses

In the seminar of 1969-1970 Lacan formalised the social bond as a set of four discourses, each a stable arrangement of four terms across four fixed positions (Vanheule, 2016). The four terms are the master signifier (S1), knowledge (S2), the barred subject ($), and the objet petit a; the four positions are the agent who addresses, the other who is addressed, the hidden truth beneath the agent, and the product left over. Holding the terms in a fixed cyclic sequence and rotating them a quarter-turn at a time generates exactly four configurations, named the discourses of the Master, the University, the Hysteric, and the Analyst.

Each discourse captures a different structure of the social link. The master's discourse is the discourse of command and of the unquestioned master signifier; the university's is the discourse of systematised knowledge that serves a hidden master; the hysteric's is the discourse of the divided subject who interrogates the master and produces knowledge; the analyst's is the discourse that occupies the position of the objet a to put the subject to work and bring forth a new master signifier (Vanheule, 2016; Rousselle, 2016). Lacan later added a fifth, the discourse of the capitalist, as a modification of the master's. Why exactly four discourses arise from the rotation, rather than the twenty-four that four terms in four positions would otherwise allow, is worked through quantitatively below. The model below rotates the terms and names the discourse each arrangement produces.

Diagnostic Structures

The Lacanian clinic replaces the symptom-based categories of descriptive psychiatry with three structures, defined by how the subject negotiated entry into the Symbolic: neurosis, psychosis, and perversion (Fink, 1997; Swales, 2010). The discriminating mechanism is the fate of the Name-of-the-Father. In neurosis the paternal signifier is installed and then repressed, yielding the familiar neurotic subject divided by a question it addresses to the Other, hysteria and obsession being its two forms. In perversion the mechanism is disavowal. In psychosis the paternal signifier was never installed at all, a mechanism Lacan calls foreclosure: what is foreclosed from the Symbolic returns in the Real, as hallucination and delusion (Vanheule, 2017).

This structural approach is the part of Lacanian theory that has generated the most sustained contemporary clinical research. Rather than ask whether a patient's symptoms match a checklist, the Lacanian clinician asks which structure organises the patient's relation to language and to the Other, and tailors the direction of the treatment accordingly, including the warning that classical interpretation can destabilise a psychotic subject (Cauwe & Vanheule, 2018; Vanheule, 2023). The approach remains controversial, but it has produced detailed single-case research and an articulated account of transference in psychosis.

The Empirical Question

What can empirical psychology make of all this? The honest answer is that most of Lacanian theory is not framed in a way that permits the operational test cognitive psychology demands, and some Lacanians regard that as a feature rather than a defect, holding that the subject of the unconscious is precisely what quantitative psychology forecloses (Parker, 2017; Hook, 2017). The theory's central terms, the objet a, jouissance, the Real, are defined by their resistance to capture, and its evidence has traditionally been the single case read in depth rather than the group comparison. This places the bulk of the framework outside the scope of falsification as ordinarily understood, a limitation it shares with much of psychoanalysis.

There are, however, points of contact. The Lacanian account of psychosis as a disturbance in the symbolic function has been brought into dialogue with cognitive and neuroscientific work on language and salience in schizophrenia, where the convergence between the foreclosure of the signifier and disordered predictive processing of meaning is suggestive rather than decisive (Ribolsi et al., 2015). Contemporary Lacanian researchers have also subjected the clinical theory to systematic single-case methods, which do not test the metapsychology but do discipline its clinical claims (Cauwe & Vanheule, 2018; De Battista, 2017). The verdict, as with the rest of the psychoanalytic family, is that the clinical observations are richer than the means available to confirm them.

Worked Example

Why are there exactly four discourses, when four terms placed in four positions would seem to allow many more? The third model above turns on this, and the count is worth making explicit. Four distinct terms (S1, S2, $, a) arranged in four distinct positions (agent, other, truth, product) give 4! = 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 = 24 possible arrangements in the abstract. Lacan does not use all twenty-four. He fixes the four terms in an invariant cyclic order, S1 → S2 → a → $ and back to S1, and generates the discourses by rotating that fixed sequence around the four positions a quarter-turn at a time.

The rotations of a fixed cyclic sequence of four elements form a cyclic group of order four: rotate by zero, one, two, or three quarter-turns, and a fourth rotation returns to the start. So the invariant ordering yields an orbit of exactly 4 = 24 / 6 arrangements, since the 24 total arrangements divide into 24 / 4 = 6 distinct cyclic orderings, of which Lacan selects one, and that one ordering produces 4 discourses under rotation. Each discourse is then identified by which single term has rotated into the position of the agent: S1 for the Master, S2 for the University, $ for the Hysteric, and a for the Analyst.

Two lessons follow. First, the number four is not arbitrary but a structural consequence of imposing a fixed cyclic order on four terms, exactly as the four seasons follow from quartering a cycle. Second, the formalism carries a substantive claim: because the positions are fixed and only the terms rotate, each discourse necessarily has a hidden truth beneath its agent and an unassimilable product it cannot recover, which is why, for Lacan, no discourse is complete and the social bond is always structured around a remainder.

Discussion

The right verdict on Lacanian theory is a sorting, and the sort runs along the line between clinical-structural fertility and empirical testability. As a generative clinical framework the theory has clearly earned its place: the structural diagnosis of neurosis, psychosis, and perversion, the account of transference, and the direction of the treatment have produced a living research tradition and a distinctive practice (Fink, 1997; Vanheule, 2017). As a theory of the subject of language it has been enormously productive outside the clinic, furnishing the humanities and critical social theory with their working vocabulary (Žižek, 1989; Parker, 2017). As an empirical psychology, judged by the standards of operational definition and group-level test, most of it simply does not compete, and its defenders largely decline the contest (Hook, 2017).

Table 1. Lacanian propositions sorted by the kind of standing they have.
Proposition Standing Basis
Structural diagnosis (neurosis/psychosis/perversion) Clinically productive Single-case research, treatment direction
The subject as an effect of the signifier Influential Humanities, critical theory, ideology critique
Foreclosure as the mechanism of psychosis Suggestive Partial convergence with cognitive work on language
Objet a, jouissance, the Real Untestable Defined by resistance to symbolisation
The four discourses as the forms of the social bond Formal model Internal coherence; no operational test

Read this way, Lacanian theory is best understood not as a rival to cognitive psychology but as a different enterprise, a hermeneutics of the speaking subject whose unit of evidence is the case and whose yield is clinical and interpretive rather than predictive (Homer, 2005). Its lasting contribution to the wider field is a sustained argument that subjectivity is constituted in language and in the relation to the other, a thesis cognitive science now meets from its own direction whenever it studies how meaning and the sense of self are built rather than given.

Current Directions

The most active empirical front is the Lacanian theory of psychosis. A Ghent-centred research programme has reformulated foreclosure and the disturbance of the signifier as testable clinical claims, pursued them through systematic single-case studies of transference and treatment, and set the results beside contemporary psychiatric and neuroscientific accounts of schizophrenia (Vanheule, 2017; Cauwe & Vanheule, 2018; Vanheule, 2023). The proposal that metaphor breaks down in psychosis has been placed in explicit dialogue with neuro-scientific research on language, one of the few points where a Lacanian construct and a cognitive measure can be brought to bear on the same phenomenon (Ribolsi et al., 2015; De Battista, 2017).

A second strand carries the four discourses into social and political analysis, where the formalism is used to characterise contemporary institutions and the mutation Lacan called the capitalist discourse (Vanheule, 2016; Rousselle, 2016). A third continues to rework the mirror stage and the theory of identification for current questions of identity and recognition, treating the specular operation as a general mechanism rather than a datable milestone (Heimann, 2022; Bailly, 2023). Running through all three is a methodological argument, pressed by critical psychologists, about whether the subject Lacan describes can be studied at all by a psychology built on measurement, or whether it requires a different kind of inquiry (Parker, 2017; Hook, 2017).

Key Researchers

Bruce Fink.

The foremost English translator of Lacan, including the complete Écrits and several seminars, and author of the standard clinical and theoretical expositions that made Lacanian concepts usable by an Anglophone readership. Google Scholar

Jacques Lacan

(1901–1981). The originator of the theory; his return to Freud reread the unconscious as structured like a language and produced the mirror stage, the three registers, the objet petit a, and the four discourses that define the tradition. Wikipedia

Jacques-Alain Miller.

Lacan's literary executor and the editor who transcribed and published the seminars, shaping the canonical form in which Lacanian theory is now read and taught. Wikipedia

Ian Parker.

A leading figure in critical and Lacanian psychology who has argued for the discipline-level stakes of Lacan's work and set out its key concepts for a psychological readership. Google Scholar · ORCID

Élisabeth Roudinesco.

The principal historian of the French psychoanalytic movement and Lacan's biographer, whose archival histories situate Lacanian theory within its institutional and intellectual context. Wikipedia

Stijn Vanheule.

The leading contemporary empirical and clinical Lacanian researcher, bringing Lacan's account of psychosis and the signifier into psychiatric diagnosis and single-case treatment research. Google Scholar · ORCID

Paul Verhaeghe.

A Ghent clinical psychoanalyst who has reformulated the Lacanian diagnostic categories for contemporary practice and linked them to debates on diagnosis and identity in late-modern culture. Wikipedia

Slavoj Žižek.

The theorist who carried Lacanian categories, the Real, the objet petit a, fantasy, into philosophy, film, and ideology critique, making Lacan a central reference well beyond the clinic. Wikipedia

Glossary

Borromean Knot.
The topological figure of three rings linked so that cutting any one frees the other two, used by the late Lacan to represent the mutual dependence of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real.
Foreclosure.
The mechanism specific to psychosis, in which the Name-of-the-Father is never installed in the Symbolic; what is foreclosed from the Symbolic returns in the Real as hallucination or delusion.
Four Discourses.
Lacan's formalisation of the social bond as four arrangements, Master, University, Hysteric, and Analyst, generated by rotating four terms through four fixed positions.
Imaginary.
The register of the image, the ego, resemblance, and identification, founded in the mirror stage; the order of wholeness and illusion in the dual relation with the other.
Jouissance.
A term for an excess enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle, bound up with the body and the Real, which the subject both seeks and cannot bear; untranslatable and deliberately so.
Mirror Stage.
The formative moment, roughly six to eighteen months, when the infant identifies with its unified image in the mirror, founding the ego on a misrecognition of a whole where the body is still fragmented.
Name-of-the-Father.
The signifier that installs the law and prohibition and anchors the subject in the Symbolic; its repression, disavowal, or foreclosure distinguishes the three clinical structures.
Objet Petit a.
The object-cause of desire: the lost object, never actually possessed, around which desire circulates; not the thing desired but the void that sets desire in motion.
Return to Freud.
Lacan's programme of recovering the radical core of Freud's discovery, against its domestication by ego psychology, by rereading it through structural linguistics and topology.
Signifier.
The basic element of the unconscious in Lacan's rewriting of Saussure: a unit of language that, placed above a resistant bar, represents the subject for another signifier rather than delivering a fixed meaning.
Subject (Barred).
The divided subject, written with a struck-through S, split by language between the conscious ego and the unconscious discourse that speaks through it; the form subjectivity takes in the Symbolic.
Symbolic.
The register of language, law, and difference, the field of the signifier and the social pact into which the subject is inserted; for Lacan the determining order of human experience.
The Other.
The Other with a capital O: the symbolic order itself, the treasury of signifiers and locus of the law through which the subject must pass to speak and to desire, distinct from the imaginary small other.
The Real.
The register of what resists symbolisation absolutely, falling outside language and returning always to the same place; manifest in trauma, impasse, and bodily jouissance.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Lacanian theory?

It is the reinterpretation of psychoanalysis developed by Jacques Lacan, built on the thesis that the unconscious is structured like a language and that the subject is an effect of the signifiers that constitute it, organised through the three registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real (Lacan, 2001; Fink, 1995).

What does it mean that the unconscious is structured like a language?

It means the unconscious is organised by the same mechanisms as language, chains of signifiers related by metaphor and metonymy, rather than by biological drive. Meaning is produced in the movement from signifier to signifier, and the subject appears in the gaps of that chain, in slips and symptoms (Lacan, 2001; Evans, 1996).

What is the mirror stage?

It is the moment, roughly between six and eighteen months, when an infant identifies with its unified image in a mirror and founds its ego on that external image. Because the image is whole while the body is still fragmented, self-recognition is from the outset a misrecognition (Lacan, 2001; Heimann, 2022).

What are the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real?

They are the three registers that organise experience: the Imaginary of image and ego, the Symbolic of language and law, and the Real of what resists symbolisation. Lacan held them co-present and mutually dependent, figured in his late work as a Borromean knot (Evans, 1996; Fink, 1995).

What is the objet petit a?

It is the object-cause of desire: a lost object that was never actually possessed, around which desire circulates without ever attaining it. It is not the thing one desires but the void that sets desire in motion, approached through part-objects such as the gaze and the voice (Lacan, 1978; Kirshner, 2005).

What are Lacan's four discourses?

They are four structures of the social bond, the Master, University, Hysteric, and Analyst, generated by rotating four terms (S1, S2, $, a) through four fixed positions (agent, other, truth, product). Each captures a different way the social link is organised around a hidden truth and an unrecoverable remainder (Vanheule, 2016; Rousselle, 2016).

How does the Lacanian clinic diagnose?

It replaces symptom checklists with three structures, neurosis, psychosis, and perversion, defined by the fate of the Name-of-the-Father: repressed in neurosis, disavowed in perversion, and foreclosed in psychosis. The structure, not the symptom list, guides the direction of the treatment (Fink, 1997; Vanheule, 2017).

Is Lacanian theory scientific?

Most of it is not framed for operational test, and many Lacanians hold that the subject of the unconscious is precisely what measurement forecloses. Its account of psychosis has some suggestive contact with cognitive research, but as an empirical psychology judged by group-level testing the framework largely declines the contest (Parker, 2017; Ribolsi et al., 2015).

References

Bailly, L. (2023). A Lacanian perspective on identity. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 104(5), 855-859. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207578.2023.2255476

Cauwe, J., & Vanheule, S. (2018). Manoeuvres of transference in psychosis: A case study of melancholia from a Lacanian perspective. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 34(3), 376-392. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjp.12377

De Battista, J. (2017). Lacanian concept of desire in analytic clinic of psychosis. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 563. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00563

Evans, D. (1996). An introductory dictionary of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Routledge.

Fink, B. (1995). The Lacanian subject: Between language and jouissance. Princeton University Press.

Fink, B. (1997). A clinical introduction to Lacanian psychoanalysis: Theory and technique. Harvard University Press.

Heimann, M. (2022). The mirror operator. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 103(5), 707-725. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207578.2022.2035732

Homer, S. (2005). Jacques Lacan. Routledge.

Hook, D. (2017). Lacanian psychoanalysis against psychology. Psychology in Society, 53, 92-95. https://doi.org/10.17159/2309-8708/2017/n53a7

Kirshner, L. A. (2005). Rethinking desire: The objet petit a in Lacanian theory. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 53(1), 83-102. https://doi.org/10.1177/00030651050530010901

Lacan, J. (1978). The seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; A. Sheridan, Trans.). Norton. (Original work published 1973)

Lacan, J. (2001). Écrits: A selection (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1966)

Parker, I. (2017). Key concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 31(2), 263-265. https://doi.org/10.1080/02668734.2017.1327262

Ribolsi, M., Feyaerts, J., & Vanheule, S. (2015). Metaphor in psychosis: On the possible convergence of Lacanian theory and neuro-scientific research. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 664. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00664

Rousselle, D. (2016). Obsession & politics: A contribution to Lacanian political psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 21(4), 348-367. https://doi.org/10.1057/pcs.2015.62

Swales, S. (2010). Psychosis or neurosis? Lacanian diagnosis and its relevance for group psychotherapists. Group, 34(2), 129-143. https://doi.org/10.1353/grp.2010.0030

Vanheule, S. (2016). Capitalist discourse, subjectivity and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1948. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01948

Vanheule, S. (2017). Conceptualizing and treating psychosis: A Lacanian perspective. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 33(3), 388-398. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjp.12301

Vanheule, S. (2023). Treating psychosis today: A Lacanian take. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 71(5), 883-906. https://doi.org/10.1177/00030651231204838

Žižek, S. (1989). The sublime object of ideology. Verso.